


Victorian Government State Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan

May, 2024





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



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Agriculture Victoria



We acknowledge and respect Victorian Traditional Owners as the original custodians of Victoria’s land and waters, their unique ability to care for Country and deep spiritual connection to it.

We honour Elders past and present whose knowledge and wisdom   
has ensured the continuation of culture and traditional practices.

DEECA is committed to genuinely partnering with Victorian Traditional Owners and Victoria’s Aboriginal community to progress their aspirations.

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**ISBN**978-1-76136-725-0 **(pdf/online/MS word)**

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# Introduction

Emergency animal diseases (EADs) are diseases that are likely to have significant effects on livestock – potentially resulting in livestock deaths, production loss, and in some cases, impacts on human health. EADs include diseases that are exotic to Australia, new and emerging diseases that are of national significance, and can also include serious outbreaks of diseases that already exist in Australia, for example, anthrax.

EADs can have a devastating impact on Victorian livestock industries with serious implications for the economy, community and environment through both the direct effects of the disease, and indirect effects such as trade restrictions. It may also have an impact on the environment and animals, including wildlife and companion animals. Australia is fortunate to be free of most serious diseases that affect animals in other parts of the world.

In 2022, detections of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and lumpy skin disease in Indonesia significantly increased Australia’s risk of an EAD incursion. At the time, the combined probability of a major EAD incursion into Australia in the next five years was estimated to be 56%[[1]](#footnote-2), which includes 11.6% for foot-and-mouth disease, 28% for lumpy skin disease, 21% for African swine fever and 13% for African horse sickness.

FMD can be considered the EAD that poses the most significant threat to Australia, due to the severe negative impacts an incursion and the resulting response can have on the Australian economy, environment and society. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES)estimates that a multiple-state FMD outbreak in Australia could have a direct economic impact on our highly export-dependent livestock industry of around $80 billion over 10 years (in 2020-21 dollars), largely due to the loss of access to that export market.[[2]](#footnote-3)

A significant EAD detection, such as foot-and-mouth disease, in Victoria or anywhere in Australia, will trigger a Class 2 emergency under Victoria's emergency management arrangements to activate a rapid response to contain and eradicate the disease as quickly as possible, as required under national biosecurity arrangements. A whole-of-government undertaking will need to deliver complex, sustained and state-wide operations. Significant resources will be mobilised across government to respond effectively and minimise impacts on the Victorian community. Effective communication and dissemination of messages to agencies, industry and the community will be critical to support preparedness, response and recovery in case of an EAD outbreak.

Disease eradication activities will align with Australia’s nationally agreed approach to responding to EADs of national significance – the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan ([AUSVETPLAN](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/ausvetplan/)) – and will be implemented in accordance with local needs and circumstances under Victoria’s emergency management arrangements.

The response activities in the event of an EAD incursion will recognise the unique knowledge, rights and interests of Aboriginal people in Victoria’s biosecurity system and be aligned with the Victorian Biosecurity Statement and other biosecurity arrangements. All response actions will be designed to ensure that Victoria will be passed along to future generations, unique and enriched, out of respect for the Traditional Owners who have always been, and continue to be, custodians of this land. Response actions will be for the sake of the people, plants, animals and culture that will live in Victoria in the future.

Preparing for, and responding to, an EAD outbreak in Australia is a shared responsibility and requires a joint effort across all levels of government, industry and the wider community.

## Purpose

The Victorian Government Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan (‘the State EAD Response Plan’) provides an overview of the arrangements for managing a major EAD emergency in Victoria and contains information on mitigation, preparedness, response, relief and recovery. The State EAD Response Plan is subordinate to the [State Emergency Management Plan](https://www.emv.vic.gov.au/responsibilities/state-emergency-management-plan-semp) (SEMP) and the [Animal, Plant, Marine and Environmental Biosecurity Sub Plan](https://files.emv.vic.gov.au/2021-08/SEMP%20Animal%2C%20Plant%2C%20Marine%20and%20Environmental%20Biosecurity%20Sub-Plan.pdf) (‘the Biosecurity Sub Plan’). Within the *Emergency Management Act 1986* and *2013* (EM Act 1986 and 2013), major biosecurity emergencies (including EADs) are considered Class 2 emergencies.

Under these arrangements, the purpose of the State EAD Response Plan is to clarify the Victorian Government’s approach to manage an EAD emergency, agency roles and responsibilities, and support preparedness planning before an outbreak occurs. This includes:

* establishing the Victorian Government’s key outcomes should an EAD emergency occur
* setting out the strategic coordination and decision-making arrangements that will be used to manage an EAD outbreak
* providing important context about major EADs for departments, agencies and other key community stakeholders and partners in a response
* detailing relevant department or agency’s role in the event of an EAD incursion
* informing EAD preparedness activities for response, relief and recovery.

The Victorian Government has developed this State EAD Response Plan to be consistent with national and state arrangements for biosecurity emergencies with input from departments and agencies who will be involved in preparing for, and responding to, an EAD incursion. While the State EAD Response Plan refers to existing emergency management plans and documents, its intention is not to duplicate the information contained in these documents. Instead, this State EAD Response Plan provides directions to websites or other sources where the reader can obtain further information if required.

The SEMP identifies the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (DEECA) as the control agency for EAD biosecurity incidents. Led by DEECA, the preparation for, response to, and recovery from an EAD outbreak is a shared responsibility and requires a partnership between national and state governments as well as Victorian departments, agencies, local councils, industry bodies, community groups and the wider community. In the event of an EAD outbreak, DEECA, support agencies and organisations will collaborate to provide an integrated, effective and efficient response for the benefit of the community, as guided by this Plan.

This State EAD Response Plan will provide Victorian Government departments and relevant agencies with guidance to inform planning to meet their statutory obligations and responsibilities under Victoria’s emergency management arrangements and support the analysis of potential impacts, risks and consequences for their organisations’ service delivery.

## Scope

The State EAD Response Plan provides strategic information about Victoria’s mitigation, preparedness, response, relief and recovery arrangements for a Level 3 EAD biosecurity emergency.

The State EAD Response Plan:

* outlines the legal framework for managing an EAD response at a national and state level
* describes the EAD response to contain and eradicate the disease, including:
* roles and responsibilities, and control and support arrangements for managing an EAD response (in accordance with the SEMP and Biosecurity Sub Plan)
* the key priorities of key officials, meetings and centres involved in control, command and coordination in a response
* addresses resourcing, staff safety and wellbeing in managing an EAD incursion
* highlights potential EAD consequences for various sectors
* strengthens accountability for managing and mitigating risks associated with an EAD incursion under Victoria’s emergency management arrangements
* outlines how industry and community will be provided with information, guidance and advice about an EAD response.

The State EAD Response Plan is supported by a suite of operational arrangements, protocols and guides that provide additional detail so that those involved before, during or after an emergency have the information they need to meet their responsibilities.

The State EAD Response Plan does not outline the response for management of an EAD if eradication of the disease is determined not feasible. If this occurs, a transition to management plan will be developed by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) in consultation with government and industry.

Appendix C provides a list of internal and external key operational documents that support an EAD response.

## Audience

The primary audiences for the State EAD Response Plan are Victorian Government departments, agencies and bodies with emergency preparedness, relief and response roles as outlined in the SEMP. For example, for Victorian Government departments and agencies, this plan will:

* support whole-of-government and portfolio specific planning for an EAD outbreak
* ensure there is awareness of the reason why particular decisions are being made
* understand when and where key decisions are being made in an EAD response.

The State EAD Response Plan may also be used by organisations, groups and individuals within the Victorian regional or agricultural sectors who may be impacted by, or involved in, an EAD emergency in preparedness, response, relief or recovery roles or functions.

## Assumptions

The State EAD Response Plan is based on the following assumptions:

* The reader is familiar with the SEMP as it outlines the holistic details of the arrangements for an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive approach to emergency management in Victoria.
* The reader is familiar with the Biosecurity Sub Plan, as it provides an overview of the current arrangements for the management of biosecurity emergencies (excluding human health emergencies and non-EAD wildlife emergencies) in Victoria.
* Details regarding relevant activities of individual agencies are covered in agency plans and supporting plans, documents and doctrine.
* The State EAD Response Plan will be activated for a Level 3 or above Class 2 EAD biosecurity emergency as defined in the Biosecurity Sub Plan. For Level 1 and 2 Class 2 EAD biosecurity emergencies, see the [Biosecurity Sub Plan](https://files.emv.vic.gov.au/2021-08/SEMP%20Animal%2C%20Plant%2C%20Marine%20and%20Environmental%20Biosecurity%20Sub-Plan.pdf). Level 4 and Level 5 Class 2 EAD biosecurity emergencies are equivalent Level 3 emergencies that require international or interjurisdictional resources.
* The State EAD Response Plan may be activated in response to a detection of an EAD emergency anywhere in Australia, not only within Victoria.
* A Level 3 or above Class 2 EAD biosecurity emergency will require activation of whole of state emergency management arrangements. Level 1 and Level 2 events are generally managed through Agriculture Victoria’s biosecurity functions under the Biosecurity Sub Plan, but in some cases a Level 2 event may also require activation of Class 2 emergency arrangements.
* A Level 3 Class 2 EAD biosecurity emergency will exceed the capacity of DEECA to resource arrangements effectively. The emergency is expected to be large, complex and protracted with significant impacts on the Victorian community requiring early initiation of support from departments and agencies.
* The incident could lead to a declaration of a State of Emergency under the *Public* *Administration Act 2004* (Vic)(PA Act) or a declaration of a State of Disaster under the EM Act 1986 by the Premier.

## Activation

The arrangements in the State EAD Response Plan are activated when a State Controller (Biosecurity) is appointed by the Control Agency Officer in Charge (CAOiC), in response to, or in preparation for an imminent Class 2 EAD emergency. For a Class 2 EAD emergency, the CAOiC is the Secretary, DEECA. This decision is informed by advice from the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of a potential or confirmed diagnosis of an EAD anywhere in Australia.

DEECA, through Agriculture Victoria, as the control agency, has arrangements in place to rapidly establish control, command and coordination arrangements. This includes the appointment of a State Controller (Biosecurity) and Deputy State Controllers to coordinate with other departments and agencies to respond to an EAD event.

## Review and evaluation

This version is an update of the Victorian Government State EAD Response Plan published in October 2022.[[3]](#footnote-4) It has been developed with relevant departments and agencies and incorporates the improvements to preparedness resulting from reviews and evaluation of exercises, as well as ongoing reform in the Victorian emergency management sector. This version of the State EAD Response Plan is current at the time of publication and remains in effect until modified, superseded or withdrawn. The arrangements included in this document are described at a point in time and there may be changes resulting from further reviews and evaluations of exercises, biosecurity emergencies and ongoing reform in the Victorian emergency management sector. The next version of the State EAD Response Plan will incorporate any further changes.

If the State EAD Response Plan is activated, DEECA, as the control agency, will organise an operational debrief with participating agencies as soon as practicable after the emergency has ceased. All agencies including recovery agencies shall be represented with a view to assessing the adequacy of the response and recommending any changes to the State EAD Response Plan, other agency plans and future operational response activities.

DEECA adopts the approved approach to lessons management defined in the Emergency Management Victoria’s Lessons Management Framework (EM-LEARN) for all of its biosecurity emergency responses. This approach is based on the national lessons management process of Observations, Insights, Lesson Identified, Lesson Learned, as defined in the [*Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook Collection: Lessons Management Handbook*](https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/lessons-management-handbook/).

DEECA or Emergency Management Victoria (EMV) may also undertake real-time monitoring and evaluation of a biosecurity emergency response, which is a key evidence input into the evaluation approach as outlined above.

# Authorising environment

Australia has well-developed EAD arrangements implemented through international agreements, national and state-based legislation and provisions, arrangements and plans. A unique feature of biosecurity emergency management is that potentially affected industries play a significant role in preparing for and responding to biosecurity incidents. To this extent, industry bodies have committed to support preparedness and response to incidents through maintaining national plans and sector specific response agreements including co-funding arrangements under the [Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/eadra/) (EADRA) (see Chapter 2.6).

As the control agency, DEECA has overall responsibility for maintaining and administering the State EAD Response Plan in accordance with the arrangements set out below.

## International arrangements

Australia is a signatory to a range of international agreements that guide EAD activities. These include agreements and standards that apply to Australia as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Resumption of trade in agricultural products after an EAD emergency may be dependent on demonstrating compliance with these standards and will be expected to come under significant scrutiny from trading partners.

## National arrangements

National biosecurity arrangements, outlined below, provide strategic oversight, coordination and management of EAD biosecurity emergencies.

### National agreements

Victoria is a signatory to a range of national agreements that underpin an EAD emergency response including:

* [Intergovernmental Agreement on B](https://federation.gov.au/about/agreements/intergovernmental-agreement-biosecurity)iosecurity (IGAB) - This Agreement between the Commonwealth, state and territory governments sets out commitments from all governments, outlines agreed national goals and objectives, and clarifies roles, responsibilities, and governance arrangements in relation to Australian biosecurity matters.

The objective of this Agreement is to strengthen Australia’s biosecurity system through enhanced national collaboration among governments in Australia. It achieves this by establishing nationally agreed approaches for the Parties to work together to prevent, prepare for, detect and mitigate biosecurity risks, and to respond, manage and recover from biosecurity incidents should they occur.

* [National Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA)](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/eadra/) - Victoria is a signatory to the EADRA, a formal, legally binding agreement between Animal Health Australia (AHA), the Commonwealth Government, all state and territory governments, and currently 14 livestock industry signatories. These arrangements mean that EADs can be responded to quickly and effectively while minimising uncertainty over management and funding. The EADRA provides for signatory industries to partner with signatory governments in sharing aspects of the decision making and costs of responding to an EAD in accordance with pre-agreed categories of cost sharing that reflect a benefit to the public and industry.

### National decision-making bodies

Under the national arrangements set out above, there are specified pre-existing bodies that make decisions on the management and cost-sharing arrangements of an EAD response (see Figure 1).

* **National Management Group (NMG)** - The NMG is the decision-making body for national EAD eradication programs under the EADRA. The NMG's role is to endorse EAD Response Plans (EADRP) prepared by each affected jurisdiction responding to an EAD and associated budget, receive advice from the CCEAD regarding the progress of disease control, and make decisions on the technical feasibility and cost-benefit for eradication. The NMG is comprised of senior executives from:
* the Commonwealth Government
* state and territory governments
* signatory industries
* AHA as an observer.

Parties are bound to make a financial contribution to the response through defined cost-sharing arrangements upon endorsement of the EADRP.

**The EADRP is distinct from this State EAD Response Plan.** Victoria’s CVO will prepare the event specific EADRP based on a technical assessment of the EAD risk and outbreak. This document is intended to support the implementation of control measures outlined by the CVO in the EADRP. The EADRP must be approved by NMG for cost sharing activities to be eligible under EADRA (see also Chapter 2.6).

* **Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD)** - The CCEAD coordinates and makes decisions on the national technical response to EAD incidents and provides advice to the NMG. The CCEAD is comprised of:
* all CVOs of the Commonwealth, state and territory governments
* one representative of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP)
* industry representatives
* AHA as an observer.

CVOs of affected jurisdictions must develop an EADRP to present to CCEAD. The CCEAD is responsible for recommending to the NMG whether a response should proceed, based on an assessment of whether the disease meets the EAD criteria and the feasibility of eradication.

* **National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network (NBCEN)** – The NBCEN produces nationally consistent public information in response to pest and disease incursions (biosecurity incidents) that impact on Australia’s agricultural industries and the environment.

The NBCEN consists of:

* communication managers from the commonwealth, state and territory agricultural agencies
* AHA
* CSIRO
* ACDP
* the Commonwealth Government Department of Health and Aged Care.

During an incident, NBCEN may expand its membership by inviting communication managers from affected industries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and food processing and supply chains.




Figure 1: Biosecurity emergency management arrangements integration with Commonwealth Government Crisis Management Framework

## State arrangements

Clearly articulated state arrangements ensure effective operational and governance accountability, and support shared responsibility for mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from EAD emergencies. Departments and agencies from across state and local governments will also be required to provide support in an EAD emergency consistent with the role responsibilities in the SEMP (see Appendix D5). These are matched against the [Victorian Preparedness Framework’s (VPF)](https://www.emv.vic.gov.au/how-we-help/emergency-management-capability-in-victoria/victorian-preparedness-framework-0) core capabilities and critical tasks that Victoria requires of departments to effectively manage before, during and after major emergencies.

### DEECA’s control agency role

Under Victoria’s state emergency management arrangements, DEECA is responsible for the following under the SEMP:

* implementing the State Emergency Management Priorities as described in the SEMP
* coordinating actions against an EAD emergency and establishing management arrangements for an integrated response to an emergency
* providing Victoria’s affected industries and communities with advice about EAD risks and mitigation strategies, and education on the state’s biosecurity emergency management arrangements
* advising the Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) on the existence of, or potential for, a biosecurity emergency in Victoria
* working with organisations at the source of an EAD outbreak to develop and oversee the implementation of effective incident response plans, including strategies to contain and eradicate active biosecurity threats
* supporting the EMC through the provision of regular situation updates and expert biosecurity advice
* providing information and strategic advice to the Premier and Cabinet on whole-of-government response activities for EAD responses
* maintaining specific plans for high-risk threats in accordance with nationally agreed animal disease strategies.

### Additional authorisation under declarations

There may be some instances when an EAD response requires additional authorisation to impose control measures to achieve the objectives of the response, for example, when an EAD detection poses a widespread risk to Victorian life or property. In such situations, the Premier of Victoria, after consultation with the Minister for Emergency Services, the Minister for Agriculture and the EMC, may declare a state of disaster under the EM Act 1986. Similarly, the Premier may also declare a state of emergency under the PA Act.

When an EAD incursion is associated with a potential or actual human illness – that is when a zoonotic disease transmits between animals and humans – consideration of appropriate control and operational arrangements may occur with the Department of Health (DH) and DEECA.[[4]](#footnote-5) This may include the issue of public health orders by the Chief Health Officer.

### EAD response governance roles and responsibilities

An EAD outbreak will require effective governance arrangements to be in place from the first day of the response to ensure effective control, command and coordination. The roles and responsibilities set out below are not exhaustive and should be read in conjunction with relevant legislation, plans, frameworks and guidelines. State level response arrangements and structures are detailed in Chapter 8 - EAD response.

Table 1 outlines the authority and role for key decision-making functions in an EAD response where DEECA is the control agency. It is important to note any role in the table can have a deputy appointed when required and an individual can only have one functional role at a time.

Control and coordination of an EAD emergency will be achieved through numerous emergency response teams. Appendix E provides an overview of key teams in the response, their responsibilities and suggested membership. This appendix is not exhaustive and membership is subject to change depending on the stage of the response, in particular in relation to the appointment of Deputy State Controllers. Further Deputy State Controllers may be appointed based on the particulars of the EAD outbreak. The Victorian Government may also provide strategic directions and make strategic decisions through Cabinet or relevant Cabinet committees.

Table 1: Responsibilities of officials in an EAD response

| **Role** | **Key EAD response responsibilities** |
| --- | --- |
| Minister for Agriculture | * Responsible for the agriculture portfolio, including DEECA’s delivery of a response to a biosecurity emergency and policies, program and legislation relevant to the agriculture sector * Delegates powers under the Victorian *Livestock Disease Control Act 1994* (LDC Act) and regulations to appropriate persons or class of persons. |
| Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) | * Ensures effective control arrangements are in place for a Class 2 emergency response and oversees the coordination of consequence management of an EAD emergency * Responsible for coordinating activities of agencies having roles or responsibilities in Class 2 emergencies * Convenes relevant state-level coordination forums such as the State Emergency Management Team (SEMT) and the State Coordination Team (SCoT) |
| Control Agency Officer in Charge (CAOiC)  Secretary, DEECA | * Overall responsibility for control of the Class 2 EAD response * Appoints State Controller (Biosecurity) to lead control arrangements under the state’s emergency management arrangements |
| Chief Executive Officer, Agriculture Victoria  **Reports to** Secretary, DEECA | * Briefs the Minister for Agriculture, the Secretary, DEECA and DEECA Executive on the EAD emergency * Responsible for Agriculture Victoria’s responses to an EAD outbreak * Leads Agriculture Victoria’s prioritisation and resources to support a response to the EAD emergency, including supports and engagements for the agriculture sector. * Represents Victoria on the National Management Group (NMG) on the state’s response to an EAD emergency. May be delegated to Executive Director, Biosecurity Victoria. |
| Executive Director, Biosecurity Victoria  **Reports to** Chief Executive Officer, Agriculture Victoria | * Provides strategic policy advice and leadership for the Victorian response, and ensures that the Chief Executive Officer, Agriculture Victoria, DEECA Executive and the Minister have appropriate briefings * Secondary spokesperson on matters related to EAD emergencies (see CVO below). |
| Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO)  **Reports to** Executive Director, Biosecurity Victoria | * Delegated authority under the LDC Act to declare restricted areas and control areas, which may include activation of Victoria’s National Livestock Standstill under national biosecurity arrangements * Provides technical and strategic advice to the State Controller (Biosecurity) to ensure the State Control Team (SCT) has the necessary information required for emergency operations * Represents Victoria on the Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD) * Develops the event specific EADRP as required under the EADRA for presentation to CCEAD * Confirms the presence of an EAD in Victoria and is responsible for notifying the Australian CVO of an EAD detection in Victoria as soon as possible within 24 hours * Primary spokesperson on matters related to EAD emergencies. |
| State Controller (Biosecurity)  **Reports to** the Control Agency Officer in Charge (CAOiC) | * Leads and manages the response to a Class 2 Level 3 biosecurity emergency * In consultation with the CAOiC and EMC, establishes a control structure for the Level 3 biosecurity emergency * Monitors the response to ensure that it continues to enable a safe and effective response to the emergency, including the appointment of Deputy State Controller(s) to support the response as required * Considers authorisation required under relevant Acts when appointing roles * May delegate responsibilities or actions to other agencies * Secondary spokesperson related to EAD emergencies * Ensures effective operational management of the State Control Centre (SCC) for functions that relate to a biosecurity emergency, and functional management between the State Biosecurity Operations Centre (SBOC) and SCC. |
| Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Operations  **Reports to** State Controller (Biosecurity) | * Leads and manages the operational biosecurity response activities, in particular tracing and surveillance, public information and communications, and management of infected premises, including destruction, disposal and decontamination operations * Ensures that unity of command and effective functional management is achieved between the SCC, SBOC, Local Control Centres (LCCs) and any Forward Command Posts (FCPs). |
| Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Livestock Standstill  *May transition into a Deputy State Controller (Movement Control) function*  **Reports to** State Controller (Biosecurity) | * Responsible for implementing and managing Victoria’s livestock standstill, including stand-up and stand-down * May transition to the Deputy State Controller (Operations) or Deputy State Controller (Movement Control) depending on the size, scale and duration of movement restrictions and permitting requirement imposed. |
| Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Policy Coordination  **Reports to** State Controller (Biosecurity) | * Ensures timely flow of information and advice on response strategy, operational activities, and relief and recovery measures drawn from key parts of the response to key officials including the Minister for Agriculture, Secretary, DEECA and Chief Executive Officer, Agriculture Victoria * Coordinates with the CVO on what decision making is occurring in national forums. |
| Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Industry Engagement  **Reports to** State Controller (Biosecurity) | * Engages with industry and other organisations, through their designated liaison personnel. |
| State Response Controller (SRC)  **Reports to** the EMC | * Leads state-wide control of Class 1 emergencies   + The SRC only has accountability for Class 1 emergencies. However, the SRC may facilitate the coordination of responder agencies and work with the SC Biosecurity to ensure integrated response in the event of a concurrent Class 1 emergency. |
| Senior Police Liaison Officer (SPLO)  **Reports to** the Chief Commissioner of Police | * Provides advice to the EMC on effective allocation of resources in responding to the EAD outbreak by liaising with Regional Emergency Response Coordinators (RERCs) and the Incident Emergency Response Coordinators (IERCs) |
| State Emergency Relief Coordinator (SERC)  **Reports to** the EMC | * Coordinates any relief services to address immediate needs that emerge as a result of the response in accordance with relevant WoVG relief and recovery plans * Ensures that relief communications in an EAD outbreak are accurate and coordinated * Ensures that relief governance arrangements are effective * Facilitates the sharing of information regarding relief efforts at state, regional and local levels as required. |
| State Recovery Coordinator (SReC)  **Reports to** the EMC | * Coordinates state-wide recovery efforts to address the impacts of an EAD outbreak in accordance with relevant whole-of-Victorian-Government (WoVG) relief and recovery plans * Partners with DEECA and other key stakeholders to identify key recovery priorities from an EAD outbreak * Facilitates state-wide information sharing on the recovery needs arising from an EAD outbreak. |
| **REGIONAL TIER – CLASS 1** | |
| Class 1 Regional Controller (RC)  **Reports to** State Response Controller | * Collaborates with the SC regarding Class 1 emergencies and the impact of Class 2 emergencies within the region. * Supports the standing-up of coordination functions for the Class 2 emergency to ensure regional-level relief and recovery, communication and engagement, and resourcing are underway in a response |
| Regional Emergency Response Coordinator (RERC)  **Communicates with** EMC via Senior Police Liaison Officer (SPLO) | * Provides coordination oversight to ensure an effective response * Coordinates agencies and resources to support the region-wide response to the emergency * Briefs the EMC and State Controller (Biosecurity) through the Senior Police Liaison Officer (SPLO). |
| Regional Emergency Relief Coordinator (RReC)  **Reports to** Regional Relief Coordination Agency | * Coordinates regional relief efforts if region-wide relief is required * Liaises with the Regional Control Team and Regional Emergency Management Team * Works with local councils and other regional partners * Ensures that information about relief activities is coordinated across the region. |
| Regional Recovery Coordinator (RRC)  **Reports to** Regional Recovery Coordination Agency | * Considers recovery needs due to the widespread impacts of EAD emergencies in each region * Leads regional recovery efforts and planning, and liaises with the State Recovery Coordinator providing regular updates * Facilitates the sharing of intelligence and information at a regional level to support local and regional recovery activities. |
| **REGIONAL TIER – CLASS 2 BIOSECURITY EMERGENCY SPECIFIC STRUCTURES**  Only appointed in specific circumstances | |
| Class 2 Regional Controller (Biosecurity)  *(if appointed)*  **Reports to** Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Operations | * Leads the regional response, including tasking of response activities to departments and agencies in the region and ensures effective control measures are being employed by the ICs * Collaborates with the Class 1 RC regarding concurrent emergencies * Assesses the regional situation, impacts and consequences of an EAD emergency * Leads standing-up of coordination functions to ensure regional-level relief and recovery, communication and engagement, and resourcing are underway in a response * Advises the Regional Control Team to support an effective EAD response alongside any concurrent emergencies * Assists with ensuring ICs in the region have appropriate resources |
| Area of Operations Controller  *(if appointed)*  **Reports to** Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Operations | * May be appointed to coordinate and manage resources across a specified area of operations, usually spanning multiple municipalities or regions * Undertakes responsibilities relating to the EAD outbreak that would be fulfilled by a Class 2 RC (Biosecurity) |
| **LOCAL TIER (BIOSECURITY INCIDENT)** | |
| Biosecurity Emergency Incident Controller (IC) supported by the Incident Management Team  **Reports to** Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Operations | * Manages the incident-tier operational response in line with directions provided by the Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Operations * Ensures timely dissemination of information to regional and state tier counterparts * Activates relief and recovery activities when necessary * Requests human resources through agency commanders and physical resources via RCs * Establishes FCPs to support additional operational activities when necessary. |
| Municipal Emergency Response Coordinator (MERC)/ Incident Emergency Response Coordinator (IERC)  **Reports to** RERC | * Coordinates agencies, people, and resources within a municipal district to support response activities. |
| Municipal Emergency Management Officer (MEMO) | * A local council officer who liaises with agencies about emergency management activities for their municipal district and helps coordinate emergency management activities for the council. |

## Legislation

The *Livestock Disease Control Act 1994* (Vic) (LDC Act)and its regulationsgovern livestock disease biosecurity activities in Victoria. Together, they operate to provide the legislative framework for the prevention, monitoring and control of livestock diseases and are designed to protect domestic and international market access and public health. The legislation provides powers and mechanisms, such as establishing control areas and restricted areas, to combat exotic disease outbreaks.

Key provisions in the LDC Act address:

* notification of diseases requirements
* licenses
* the establishment of control and restricted areas
* livestock and property identification
* compensation arrangements
* destruction and disinfection, including the issuing of destruction orders
* powers of inspectors, including the issuing of quarantine notices

In an EAD outbreak, DEECA will administer the legislative provisions outlined above. Any relevant orders will be published and gazetted accordingly, and any legal biosecurity requirements to limit the spread of the disease will be communicated by emergency warning, communications, public engagement, and other engagement channels in accordance with the WoVG EAD Communications Plan (see Chapter **Error! Reference source not found.**).

### Other relevant legislation

In addition to this, the following Acts and Regulations may relate to the management of EAD responses:

* *Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986* (Vic) (POCTA Act)and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Regulations 2019
* *Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Control of Use) Act 1992* (Vic)and Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Control of Use) Regulations 2017
* *Environment Protection Act 2017* (Vic)
* *Planning and Environment Act* *1987* (Vic)
* *Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008* (Vic)and Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2019
* *The Food Act 1984* (Vic)

A complete list of relevant legislation is provided at Appendix B.

## Hierarchy of emergency management plans

This State EAD Response Plan supports the Biosecurity Sub Plan and aligns with nationally agreed biosecurity plans and state-level emergency management plans (See Figure 2).



Figure 2: Hierarchy of emergency management plans relevant to emergency animal disease response

**Event specific EAD Response Plans (EADRPs)**

Delivery of the response is guided by the event-specific EADRP, which is developed by the CVO of each affected jurisdiction and approved by the NMG upon recommendation by CCEAD as required under the EADRA. The EADRP provides the high-level strategy and details of the activities to be undertaken and provides an indicative budget. The EADRP is generally based on the relevant AUSVETPLAN disease response strategy and adapted to the particular disease incident. If an EAD is detected in Victoria, the CVO will develop an EADRP for NMG consideration. If an EAD is not present in Victoria, an EADRP may still be developed to undertake relevant disease surveillance and preventative measures cost shared under EADRA.

Where possible, representatives of affected industry parties (EADRA signatories) participate in the review and updating of the EADRP.

The initial EADRP is considered at the first meeting of the CCEAD, following the reporting of an EAD incident with the objective that the CCEAD recommends the EADRP to the NMG for approval. The EADRP must be agreed by all affected parties (governments and industry) through the relevant NMG members. Endorsement of the EADRP by the NMG:

* formally triggers the commencement of the response phase under the national arrangements as well as the cost-sharing arrangements of the response in accordance with the EADRA
* commits jurisdictional and industry partners to following the key strategies and core operational activities identified in the EADRP
* the EADRP becomes the agreed initial response strategy for the affected jurisdiction(s).

The EADRP is subject to constant review throughout the event and is updated on a regular basis as more information becomes available.

Timely approval of the EADRP and associated funding is crucial, as any delays will impede communication, coordination and response activities.

The Victorian State EAD Response Plan may be enacted before an EADRP is approved by CCEAD to facilitate initial operations – such as a livestock standstill and early tracing and surveillance – required to inform the EADRP and limit the spread of disease.

## Response funding

The costs of an EAD emergency response can be significant. The approval of the EADRP by the NMG endorses both the plan and the associated budget for response activities for cost sharing, with an agreed upper limit of expenditure. Costs are subsequently reimbursed from industry and government partners through the mechanisms identified in the EADRA.

Under the EADRA, categorisation of diseases is used to determine the proportional levels of funding from government and industry parties. Cost sharing arrangements for the major EAD threats can be found on [AHA’s website](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/eadra/).

Cost sharing under the EADRA is only among signatories and the contribution from specific industries is specified in the EADRA depending on the disease. Industry contribution is determined in relation to the industry’s Gross Value of Production (GVP). Non-signatory industries may also be affected, but do not contribute to the costs nor participate in decision making around cost sharing. The NMG may determine that the compensation paid by a party to a participant in an industry, for which the relevant representative body is not a party to the Deed, will or will not be eligible for cost sharing.

An EADRP in which budgeted costs exceed 1% of the GVP of the industry(s) affected by the EAD, and 2% of the GVP of affected industries in the case of FMD, requires specific consideration.

Responses undertaken under the EADRA are subject to the appointment of an efficiency advocate who provides assurance to the parties that a cost-shared response is being conducted as described in an effective and efficient manner and provides regular reports to the NMG. An independent financial audit will also be undertaken and State lead agencies are required to maintain records in an auditable form and be able to substantiate any claims before payment is made.

Any proposed significant variations from AUSVETPLAN must be identified in the EADRP and will only be cost shared if approved.

Victoria may need to perform significant activities that are ineligible for these cost sharing arrangements, including initial disease control activities and all relief and recovery activities of the response. More details on cost sharing are provided in the EADRA and [EADRA Resource Document](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/EADRA-Business-rules.pdf).

# EAD threats

Annual risk assessments are conducted to monitor key diseases that threaten Victorian livestock industries, companion animals and unmanaged animals (e.g. pests and wildlife). This list currently features more than 30 animal diseases of interest. These include EADs that are known to already exist in Australia (e.g. anthrax and Hendra virus), diseases exotic to Australia (e.g. FMD, African swine fever and lumpy skin disease) and new diseases that may emerge in the future (e.g. mutations of existing strains of a virus).

## Victoria’s risk of an EAD outbreak

Biosecurity threats have exponentially increased over the past decade and recent detections of EADs in neighbouring countries have significantly escalated biosecurity risks for Australia. With FMD and lumpy skin disease now established in Indonesia, as well as African swine fever in Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea, the risk of an EAD incursion in Victoria has increased substantially. In 2022, the probability of a major EAD incursion into Australia in the next five years was estimated at 56% by the Centre for Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Assessment (CEBRA).[[5]](#footnote-6) This heightened risk environment will remain for many years to come. It last took Indonesia a sustained 12-year vaccination campaign to successfully eradicate FMD. These diseases are particularly difficult to prevent, detect and control.

Several factors increase Victoria’s risk of an incursion and rapid spread of a disease including:

* dense livestock populations
* close proximity of farm businesses (e.g. by daily milk collections and feed trucks)
* mixed species of pigs, sheep and beef cattle for example, on single properties and/or in relatively close proximity
* suitable climatic conditions which are shifting with climate change
* high numbers of livestock movements from multiple jurisdictions into Victoria for markets and processing.

An EAD outbreak will have profound economic and social impacts on the Victorian community. See Chapter 4 Consequence management, for an analysis of the implications an EAD outbreak could have on the Victorian community.

## Major EAD threats to Victoria

An incursion of any of the four major EAD threats to Victoria detailed below would be expected to activate this State EAD Response Plan in conjunction with the national arrangements set out above. There are other major EADs which may require a state-wide EAD response and therefore would also activate this State EAD Response Plan.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **African swine fever:** African swine fever is a contagious viral disease of domestic and feral pigs that causes the rapid death of most pigs that become infected. The virus is spread between pigs by direct contact, and to new groups of pigs by consumption of infected meat or meat products, by bites of some insects, and/or from contaminated feed, water, clothing, footwear, vehicles and equipment. If introduced into Australia, African swine fever could have a significant impact on pig health and production and have major effects on the domestic pork industry and regional economies. A legislated ban on the feeding of meat and meat products to pigs aims to reduce the risk of infected materials being fed to pigs. Seizures of pork products containing African swine fever virus fragments, both at the border and in retail products, reinforce the ongoing risk faced by Australia, the need for sound preparedness and the importance of compliance with Australia’s strict biosecurity requirements. | A close up of pig trotters with African Swine Fever  Figure 3: African swine fever  Source: Agriculture Victoria |
| **Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD):** FMD is a highly contagious disease affecting all cloven-hoofed animals including cattle, sheep, goats, camelids, deer and pigs. Cloven-hoofed animals are those with divided hooves. It does not affect horses or zebras. Vehicles, equipment, people and footwear/clothing can spread the disease in addition to the movement of infected livestock.  The consequences of an outbreak are significant to not only livestock and agricultural industries, but also to broader businesses and economies. Australia relies heavily upon exports and international market access for livestock and livestock products, and these would be immediately lost upon detection of FMD. Markets can take many years to regain competitiveness or may be lost permanently, causing significant long-term economic loss. | A picture of a cow with foot and mouth disease  Figure 4: Foot-and-mouth disease  Source: Animal Health Australia |
| **Lumpy skin disease:** lumpy skin disease is a viral disease of cattle and buffalo which causes firm, raised nodules around the skin of the head, neck and body. Animals can become infected through biting insects or close contact with contaminated equipment and clothing for example.  The disease would have significant and far-reaching impacts should there be an incursion in Australia. There would be considerable economic losses with restrictions being placed on both domestic and international markets. | A picture of a cow with lumpy skin disease  Figure 5: Lumpy skin disease  Source: Animal Health Australia |
| **Equine influenza:** equine influenza is a disease of horses and donkeys, caused by a highly contagious virus that can be spread horse-to-horse or by humans on their skin, clothes and riding equipment. Infected horses show signs of fever, a dry, hacking cough and nasal discharge.  In 2007, equine influenza was detected in a horse in New South Wales (NSW) after the virus escaped quarantine. After 6 months, and a total estimated cost of $571 million to Australian governments, the disease was eradicated through vaccination and strict movement controls. Australia is the only country in the world to have eradicated equine influenza following an incursion. | A picture of a horse with equine influenza.  Figure 6: Equine influenza  Source: NSW Department of Primary Industries |

## EAD response mission

The mission for Victoria’s EAD response will be to eradicate the disease in the shortest time possible while minimising the social, environmental, welfare and economic impacts on the Victorian community.

Eradication is the nationally agreed policy for responding to an FMD, lumpy skin disease, equine influenza or African swine fever incursion in Australia. Should eradication be determined as not technically feasible, then national arrangements will be used to determine the most appropriate course of action (see above).

An interstate EAD outbreak may trigger the need for an emergency response and the State EAD Response Plan to be activated, even though the EAD is not present in Victoria. In this case, the focus of activities will be on preventing the spread of the disease to Victoria, completing surveillance to demonstrate freedom of the disease and facilitating safe trade, along with managing relief and recovery activities associated with the wider consequences of an EAD outbreak, such as suspension of exports impacting on Victorian producers and businesses.

## **Principles** of a disease response

Disease control and eradication activities will align with international standards and agreed national obligations under the AUSVETPLAN and will be tailored to meet local needs and circumstances.

Control and eradication are supported by a combination of strategies which may include:

* rapid recognition, diagnosis and laboratory confirmation of cases by the CSIRO Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP), in Geelong, Victoria or Agriculture Victoria’s Veterinary Diagnostics Services located at AgriBio, Centre for AgriBioscience, Bundoora
* application of quarantine and movement controls supported by legislated declared areas for disease control purposes (e.g. declaration of control and restricted areas, implementation of a national livestock standstill for FMD or widespread controls on the movement of horses for equine influenza)
* tracing and surveillance to determine the source and extent of infection (including in wildlife and feral animals as necessary) and to provide proof of freedom
* destruction, disposal and decontamination of affected animals, animal products, fodder, fittings and vehicles consistent with national obligations
* vaccination to reduce susceptibility of animals to infection and clinical disease, and potentially reduce virus excretion and spread (if approved and available)
* relief and recovery programs, including compensation
* increasing public awareness
* zoning and/or compartmentalisation to facilitate trade and business continuity.

**Table 2 Disease Control Strat****egy Summary**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | African swine fever | Foot-and-mouth disease | Lumpy skin disease | Equine influenza |
| Quarantine, movement restrictions & declared areas | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill |
| National livestock standstill | N/A | Checkmark with solid fill | N/A | Checkmark with solid fill |
| Tracing and surveillance | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill |
| Destruction of animals | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | N/A |
| Disposal and decontamination of contaminated items | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill | Checkmark with solid fill |
| Vaccination (if required and approved) | Close with solid fill\* | Checkmark with solid fill \*\* | Checkmark with solid fill \*\* | Checkmark with solid fill\*\* |
| Vector (insect) control | Checkmark with solid fill | N/A | Checkmark with solid fill | N/A |

\* vaccines are not available currently for African swine fever

\*\* vaccines permitted for use in Australia under emergency permit conditions only

## Animal welfare

Animal welfare is a shared responsibility of everyone involved. Like other emergencies - such as flood, fire or drought - the owner, manager or custodian of the animals involved has primary responsibility for their welfare. This will include custodians who have responsibility for unmanaged animals to the extent required under relevant legislation. DEECA has responsibility for coordinating relief for animals, if it is required, under the SEMP. Given the nature of an EAD, DEECA may acquit this role through its control arrangements and operations.

Although disease control and eradication are the major objectives in any EAD response, the maintenance of acceptable animal welfare standards is integral to response activities and should always be regarded as a high priority. All livestock, feral animals and wildlife, including those intended for euthanasia, have basic welfare needs such as:

* adequate feed and water
* adequate space
* freedom from pain, injury, disease and obvious discomfort
* freedom from unnecessary fear and distress
* the ability to express normal patterns of behaviour.

During an EAD response with the introduction of restrictions and implementation of disease control activities, there can be significant impacts and risks to animal welfare. These may include:

* limited feed and/or water onsite
* inadequate accommodations (e.g. space - overcrowding, shade, shelter, and bedding material)
* limited access to abattoirs or knackery services
* limited access to urgent veterinary care
* limited or shortages in trained staff.

The primary responsibility for animal welfare remains with the person in charge of the animal. In Victoria, the POCTA Act and its regulations protect the welfare of animals. These standards must be maintained. Every effort must be made to ensure essential provisions are provided to animals as a minimum without compromising biosecurity efforts.

In addition, there can be significant financial hardship for livestock owners directly and indirectly affected by the disease due to the likely loss of export markets and disruptions to the supply chain, where their normal ability to sell and provide care for their animals is compromised.

DEECA, as the control agency, will take appropriate pre-emptive actions to minimise risks of animal welfare problems developing. These actions will be based on management strategies, situational-based information for each property, risk assessments and a timely, transparent and auditable decision-making process. Animal welfare officers will be located at the SBOC and LCCs to provide advice and coordinate actions aimed at avoiding and managing welfare problems.

It is imperative that everyone involved in the EAD response is aware of the importance of animal welfare and the need for accurate, reliable information on which to base decisions. All field officers are required to report any concerns about existing or potential animal welfare problems through the chain of command to animal welfare officers at the LCC and/or SBOC.

# Consequence management

Under the EM Act 2013*,* the EMC is responsible for the coordination of agencies who are managing consequences of major emergencies, including EAD emergencies. The EM Act 2013 defines consequence management as the coordination of agencies that are responsible for managing or regulating services or infrastructure which are or may be affected by a major emergency.

EMV will provide systems-level consequence management coordination, with agencies remaining responsible for the management of consequences specific to their respective portfolios as per the SEMP. Joint planning will be required in circumstances where concurrent emergencies in and around impact areas could significantly affect the community and potentially an agency’s ability to respond.

Some potential consequences of a large EAD outbreak and response are described in Table 3.

Table 3 Assessment of potential consequences in a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Victoria

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Factor** | **Examples of possible consequences** |
| Political | * Trade embargos will shut down relevant livestock and livestock product exports immediately. Likely to also impact non-related markets as well. * Victoria must comply with national response and reporting. * Response decisions or activities may incite protests and social tension e.g. stamping out policy. * Response to the outbreak may be politicised with heightened accountability, disruption to commitments and priorities, and the stability of government e.g. animal welfare issues, emergency powers and movement restrictions. |
| Economic | * Livestock product exports (including red meat, pork and dairy) will stop immediately if an EAD such as FMD or lumpy skin disease is detected anywhere in Australia. Impacts to these industries will be devastating and likely have long-term effects running for several years, given that:   + Victoria is Australia’s largest sheep meat producer and third largest beef producer. Victoria exports around 70 percent of the red meat it produces.   + Victoria produces around 61 percent of Australia’s dairy products and is the largest dairy exporter accounting for 73 per cent of Australia’s total dairy exports by value.   + Victoria is Australia’s third largest producer of pig meat and the second largest pig meat exporter accounting for 25 per cent of Australia’s total pig meat exports, although this is a small volume compared to other meat export markets. * Meat and dairy producers may lose some, or all of their usual markets, resulting in loss of predicted income and increased costs to carry animals over. * Meat and dairy processors will face significant market disruption through the loss of export markets and re-adjustment of the domestic market, including uncertain domestic demand in the face of consumer reaction to the event. * Livestock transport operators (among other transport operators) may be impacted by a loss of income/employment due to a downturn in the livestock industry, livestock movement restrictions, control orders, and road or border closures. * Domestic meat prices are likely to fall considerably due to oversupply. * Rural and regional Victoria will be heavily impacted by the economic impact on agricultural industries and reduced tourism in particular. * Loss of agricultural sector jobs and businesses may have broader economic ramifications and lead to reduced spending across all rural businesses. * Road and landfill infrastructure pressures may arise from large volumes of deceased animals being buried in off-farm landfill sites. Infrastructure and transport corridor planning may require consideration of these risks and additional environmental assessments, including whether sufficient capacity and infrastructure is in place to meet other waste disposal commitments. |
| Social | * Rural and regional Victoria may face a range of social impacts, including financial stress, mental health and wellbeing issues, reduction in social gatherings, fear, increase in family violence, potential ostracism, effects on children and teenagers. * Halt to normal life for many people, including being stood down and loss of income. * Impacts to Traditional Owners’ connection to land and Country and aspirations for self-determination. * Self-imposed isolation to maintain biosecurity (quarantine is not applied to people) and avoid community conflict, which may be exacerbated by uncertainty over duration and spread. * Movement restrictions from potential road closures and traffic management points. * Potential lack of understanding about the response, especially in culturally diverse communities, resulting in anger, resentment, breaches of restrictions, etc. * Potential social unrest and conflict over response activities e.g. stamping out policy and movement restrictions. * Confusion about food safety (whether meat and dairy are safe to consume) and health impacts (e.g. confusion between FMD and lumpy skin disease). * Long-term demographic and land ownership shifts as some businesses may not remain viable and producers could exit the industry or change to other productions. * Potential animal welfare issues for enterprises unable to keep or feed carry-over animals. |
| Technological | * Increased communication requirement (phone and internet) in response areas for responders and residents. * Increased collection and storage of landholders’ and livestock owners’ private information through surveillance, testing and tracing (e.g. collection of private information through tracing interviews and collection of details of farmers seeking to move livestock via permitting systems). * Potential compensation/grant fraud. |
| Legal | * Control and Restricted Area declarations. Quarantine of infected properties. Movement controls and permits. Emergency authorisation of officers under various legislative Acts. * Consideration of the impact of orders on rights and obligations of the community and particular groups under relevant legislation, including the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities and legislation relating to Traditional Owner groups. * Enforcement of requirements and increased compliance activities to respond to potential breaches of the Control Orders. Response requirement to destroy susceptible and at-risk animals may cause an increase in legal challenges to government. * Potential legal risks for the Victorian Government (e.g. legal challenge to response or orders). |
| Environmental | * Environmental and cultural heritage impacts if risks are not managed. * Ongoing monitoring of environmental impacts required, including carcass burial sites (e.g. water run-off into downstream catchments). * Potential wildlife and feral animal control operations on private and public land. * Impact on threatened wildlife species if impacted by the EAD. * Potential limits to access critical infrastructure, amenities and other built environments key for community welfare. * Impacts to ground and surface water from waste if risks are not managed. |
| Organisational | * Interagency co-operation required for an extended period of time – human resource demands impact business-as-usual and government initiative delivery. * Budget impacts. * Staff fatigue, mental health and wellbeing. * Data storage and privacy requirements. * Potential reputational risk. |
| Media | * Engaging all media platforms will be extremely important. Mainstream media will influence many social consequences. * Impossible to control private social media messaging – influence through Agency messaging. |

# Whole-of-government roles and responsibilities

Support and contribution from Commonwealth, state and territory government departments, agencies, and local councils as well as industry, communities and individuals are essential for Victoria to be able to mount a robust and an effective response to an EAD outbreak and to mitigate its consequences.

Appendix D outlines the key roles and responsibilities of different government agencies and other entities that will be involved in an EAD response. However, this is not an exhaustive list of the roles and responsibilities of these agencies and other groups. It is expected that all Commonwealth and state government departments and agencies, local councils, industry, communities, and individuals will comply with a request for support as reasonably practicable to reduce the impacts of an EAD incursion.

Appendix D should be read in conjunction with the roles and responsibilities outlined in the SEMP.

# EAD mitigation

Mitigation means the elimination or reduction of the incidence or severity of emergencies and the minimisation of their effects. Government, industry and the community all have a role to play in the mitigation of emergencies as part of their business-as-usual functions.

Commonwealth and state government departments and agencies, local councils, industry, communities and individuals have a shared responsibility to take steps to prepare for and mitigate the impact of an EAD.

## Government

The role of the Commonwealth, states and territory governments is set out in the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) and in the Biosecurity Sub Plan.

The Victorian Government is responsible for aspects of biosecurity within Victoria including:

* maintaining legislation and regulation that control activities that have the potential to cause or contribute to a disease outbreak (including compliance and enforcement)
* leading the development of policies, plans and exercises related to EAD preparedness activities within Victoria and contributing to national activities
* managing eradication and containment programs for nationally agreed and other pest and disease incursions
* undertaking surveillance and diagnostics to support early detection and diagnosis, and maintaining capacity to prepare for, detect and respond to exotic pest and disease incursions
* maintaining and administering systems to support agreed national traceability requirements
* negotiating and facilitating domestic trade, including setting entry conditions for products entering the state from elsewhere in Australia based on biosecurity risks
* ongoing stakeholder engagement and communication, and partnership building.

The Victorian Government has put in place a number of provisions to support EAD mitigation:

* provision of a 24/7 hotline to support reporting of suspected exotic animal diseases (Emergency Animal Disease Hotline, **1800 675 888**)
* trained veterinarians and animal health staff who investigate any suspected emergency animal disease reports
* significant disease investigation program that subsidises farmers and veterinarians to incentivise investigation of unusual disease or deaths of livestock on farms
* prohibited pig feed restrictions and associated compliance activities
* regular communication and engagement activities to raise awareness, encourage early reporting, registration of properties and use of the National Livestock Identification System (NLIS)
* property identification and livestock traceability requirements.

Victoria’s local councils can also support EAD mitigation by:

* complying with legislative responsibilities as:
* owners or operators of livestock saleyards
* road managers
* authorised officers (e.g. environmental health officers).
* assist DEECA with the distribution of information to the community
* participate in planning and exercises to prepare for an EAD outbreak.

## Industry and businesses

Industry and businesses also have a key role in mitigating biosecurity risks and supporting an EAD response. DEECA works with the Commonwealth, state and territory governments and member industries to support the delivery of biosecurity outcomes, including industry biosecurity plans developed and owned by industry associations.

National, state and local industry and community organisations support biosecurity by:

* providing tools to implement preventative biosecurity practices and improve resilience including exercises, training, education and information sharing
* conducting extension activities, such as farm biosecurity plan workshops, that drive adoption of best practices
* engaging with industry members and businesses, utilising their expertise, understanding their needs and providing them with options to better mitigate their risks
* delivering effective and tailored messaging
* understanding consumer and community expectations and how they might impact production systems
* advocating to government to represent the interests of their members
* providing expertise to government to maintain and improve national and state-based response arrangements.

Government departments and agencies support industries and businesses by providing, or pointing to, resources to help plan and prepare for a biosecurity emergency. Fostering engagement and relationships with external industry peak bodies in peace time supports a collaborative approach that emphasises shared ownership.

The Livestock Industry Consultative Group (LICG), convened by DEECA, brings together sector representatives of the pig, sheep, beef cattle, dairy, alpaca, goat and livestock transport industry groups. The LICG provides a forum to identify and consult on issues, develop and test preparedness measures, and support ongoing communication.

DEECA regularly delivers numerous biosecurity awareness and educational programs, including e-learning courses, webinar series, attendance at field days, producer events and meetings to increase industry awareness about EAD threats, and the mitigation and preparedness actions needed by producers.

Other tools and programs to assist the industry to prevent, eliminate and minimise biosecurity risks include training and promotional activities to support the adoption of biosecurity plans, Property Identification Codes (PICs) and traceability tools.

Property and livestock identification requirements support rapid tracing in the event of an EAD emergency. All livestock owners are required by law to have a PIC for the properties on which livestock, horses, or over 50 poultry reside. All livestock businesses (saleyards, cattle scales, abattoirs, knackeries and stock agents) must also have a PIC. Agriculture Victoria maintains the register of PICs.

In addition, all cattle, sheep and goat movements in Victoria must be recorded on the NLIS database for the purpose of identification and traceability. All pig movements in Victoria are required to be recorded on the PigPass database.

Primary producers are responsible for the preparation of a farm biosecurity plan to prevent and minimise the risk of spread of pests and diseases on and between farms. It is the responsibility of primary producers to implement the plans and communicate any requirements to staff and visitors. Fam biosecurity plans are often an integral part of farm assurance programs such as the Livestock Production Assurance (LPA) program and the Australian Pork Industry Quality (APIQ) program. Industry specific biosecurity plans are available through industry websites and Agriculture Victoria’s website.

The livestock transport sector supports its members through planning and dissemination of information about the obligations of livestock transporters in preparing for, and responding to, an EAD outbreak, including being ready to support a livestock standstill in the situation of an FMD outbreak.

Department of Jobs, Skills, Industry and Regions (DJSIR) works with post-farm gate businesses including processors, food manufacturers, supermarkets and supply chain businesses to encourage industries and businesses to better understand their biosecurity responsibilities, including through dissemination of [resources](https://agriculture.vic.gov.au/biosecurity/animal-diseases/foot-and-mouth-disease/resources-to-help-you-talk-about-foot-and-mouth-disease) through existing channels like Business Victoria and its Regional Partnerships.

## Local councils and communities

Local councils and communities can play a critical role in mitigating the impacts of an EAD outbreak through preparedness initiatives that are relevant to their constituents and communities. DEECA will work with councils and communities, including engaging with and developing partnerships with Traditional Owner groups, to support their preparedness for an EAD outbreak. This may include providing information on the risks and impacts of an EAD outbreak and response and activities that can minimise the impacts on the community and constituents. For community groups, this will also include establishing pathways to support their engagement and participation in an EAD response, if it is required.

## Individuals and households

Community members can play a key role in mitigating biosecurity risks by educating themselves on biosecurity prevention measures and understanding what is ‘normal’ using the information on biosecurity provided on [Agriculture Victoria’s website](https://agriculture.vic.gov.au/biosecurity/animal-diseases/foot-and-mouth-disease/resources-to-help-you-talk-about-foot-and-mouth-disease).

Early detection is critical to minimising the size of an EAD emergency response as these diseases can spread very rapidly before they are detected. A number of campaigns have been delivered to ensure the community is aware of biosecurity risks and practices in anticipation of an EAD outbreak.

The LDC Act requires all those who suspect or know of the presence of specified diseases to report that knowledge to the relevant authorities.

Suspected detections of EADs should be reported to the 24-hour free call service Emergency Animal Disease Hotline on **1800 675 888**,or through the[Notify Nowapp](https://agriculture.vic.gov.au/biosecurity/animal-diseases/notifiable-diseases). Further information on notification requirements and how to notify can be found on the [Agriculture Victoria website.](https://agriculture.vic.gov.au/biosecurity/animal-diseases/emergency-animal-diseases)

# EAD preparedness

DEECA has overall responsibility for preparedness activities associated with an EAD emergency and acquitting Victoria’s obligations under the IGAB. All signatories to the IGAB and the EADRA have a legal obligation to have the necessary resources and arrangements in place to manage an EAD emergency.

Integrated WoVG preparedness for an EAD follows the Victorian Preparedness Framework and has been boosted through the WoVG EAD Preparedness Program.

Victoria’s preparedness program aims to enhance whole-of-government capability to respond to an EAD outbreak to deliver a rapid, coordinated and appropriately resourced response in accordance with this State EAD Response Plan, state emergency management arrangements and national biosecurity arrangements.

Victoria’s EAD preparedness activities have been delivered under four focus areas – i) policy and programs, ii) communications and engagement, iii) systems, and iv) workforce and skills – with a clear vision to enhance the whole-of-government ability to respond to an EAD outbreak.

Planning and preparedness at regional and local levels is contributing to local and regional EAD planning through the Municipal Emergency Management Planning Committees (MEMPC) and the Regional Emergency Management Planning Committees (REMPC).

Importantly, departments, agencies, industry partners[[6]](#footnote-7) and key stakeholders should continue to consider the consequences of an EAD outbreak and prepare to manage these consequences in accordance with national plans, the Victorian Preparedness Framework and Victoria’s emergency management arrangements (see Chapter 2.3).

## Surge resourcing

DEECA has undertaken significant work to identify workforce needs for a major EAD response. Models and arrangements have been developed to secure sufficient surge workforce resourcing for control agency functions.

DEECA will seek surge resourcing through other departments and agencies across the Victorian Public Service (VPS), Emergency Service Organisations and the private sector (such as private veterinarians). DEECA is working with representatives from all departments and agencies to develop an effective and efficient workforce model to meet resource needs in a timely manner and ensure safety requirements and capability/training needs are met. Because of the potential scale of a response to an EAD outbreak, DEECA is also undertaking planning to enable additional surge resourcing to be accessed through other pathways, such as activating retired staff, students or resources from interstate and international jurisdictions.

This surge resourcing model for an EAD outbreak will be underpinned by an EAD Workforce and Capability Plan. This plan will be implemented through appropriate agreements (e.g. Memoranda of Understanding and private sector service agreements) and other arrangements (e.g. use of labour hire) to secure the necessary workforce as well as a training program. The EAD Workforce and Capability Plan and supporting materials will be reviewed regularly to ensure they align with continuous improvements in preparedness arrangements undertaken by DEECA.

The EAD Workforce and Capability Plan supports surge resourcing for DEECA’s control agency functions. Departments and agencies with supporting responsibilities under the SEMP will also undertake relevant planning in accordance with their responsibilities that may fall within their emergency management remit during an EAD outbreak.

### EAD Workforce and Capability Plan

The EAD Workforce and Capability Plan’s purpose is to increase Victoria’s preparedness by identifying the actions needed to secure and appropriately train the workforce required to support an EAD response.

The EAD Workforce and Capability Plan describes:

* the need for the surge workforce
* the various sources of potential surge workforce and the strategy of engagement for the different workforce pools
* the processes by which staff will be onboarded into an EAD response and the resourcing method for requesting and deploying human resources
* deployment arrangements
* the training programs to ensure capability and development needs are met
* ongoing connections to the workforce pools
* workforce support needs, including mental health and wellbeing support.

Established processes and procedures for the deployment of personnel will also be used and these will be referenced in the plan.

**EAD Capability Framework**

The EAD Capability Framework is designed to deliver ‘all-the-time’ training for identified roles and ‘just-in-time’ training for the surge workforce. The EAD Capability Framework will outline the training pathways, role endorsement and accreditation, and capability development opportunities including but not limited to:

* training modules
* inductions and job ready training
* pathways for accessing the training.

DEECA will maintain learning and development records. The framework will include integration into other DEECA ‘all-emergencies’ training (including the DEECA Class 2 State Controller training program), and training provided under the Victorian Emergency Management Sector Training and Capability Development Model and the upcoming National Biosecurity Training Hub.

DEECA will collaborate with agencies to develop and deliver components of EAD training. Where appropriate, the training modules and other aspects of the training framework will be shared broadly across industry and other agencies to support the broader capability development for EAD.

### Industrial relations and safety

As an EAD response will require a whole-of-government response, there are several industrial relations and safety matters, including medical and vaccination capabilities, that are identified through the EAD Workforce and Capability Plan.

#### Awards and agreements

While there is not an established agreed set of common employment entitlements for employees performing incident and emergency response in emergency management, DEECA will work with all agencies to agree upon the entitlements applicable for employees under each departmental resource sharing agreement, based on the existing terms and conditions set out in the relevant enterprise agreement appendices.

#### Occupational health and safety (OHS)

The health and safety of all personnel involved in providing support during an EAD emergency is a primary consideration. This State EAD Response Plan sets out the following general guidance for all workers participating in a response or entering a response worksite. The following OHS principles apply:

* Departments and agencies will fulfil their obligations to comply with all relevant occupational health and safety legislation.
* All departments and agencies are jointly responsible for OHS noting the control agency has primary responsibility for the duration of workforce mobilisation and deployment.
* DEECA must ensure that employees who are deployed temporarily to other duties, roles or agencies receive induction on OHS procedures, equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE) relevant to those duties and worksite(s) before they commence duties.
* Employees must fulfil their OHS obligations including cooperating in the implementation of risk control measures. They are required to take reasonable steps to ensure that they do not perform an action or make any omission that creates or increases an existing risk to their health and safety or to that of others in or near the workplace. See Section 25 of the *Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004* (Vic).
* Employees operating plant and machinery must provide appropriate licence/qualifications to the control agency.
* Employees should advise their managers of any risks to their health and safety arising directly or indirectly from mobilisation/deployment and report hazards and incidents.
* All personnel deployed will comply with relevant health, fitness and training requirements, such as needing a Q fever or influenza vaccination for field-based roles.
* All personnel must be adequately trained to perform their tasks and manage risks and conflicts that may arise in the conduct of their roles.
* The support agency remains responsible for workers compensation insurance coverage.
* DEECA must advise the support agency of any reportable OHS incidents involving support agency personnel resulting from emergency management activities.
* OHS principles will also be carefully applied to high-risk activities required in an EAD outbreak. This includes the use of firearms, heavy machinery and exposure to hazardous materials.

#### Avoiding fatigue

In addition to the OHS principles set out above, fatigue management will be critical to the effective delivery of a response to an EAD outbreak. Fatigue in a work context is more than feeling tired or drowsy – it is an acute and/or ongoing state of tiredness that leads to mental, emotional and/or physical exhaustion (or all) and reduces a person’s ability to perform work safely and effectively.

DEECA as the control agency will ensure that fatigue management practices are in place for an EAD response to ensure it is effective, sustainable and compliant with OHS obligations. Departments and agencies deploying staff in a support role should also have regard to fatigue management noting the primary and joint responsibilities set out above. Key considerations to avoid fatigue in personnel deployed during an EAD response include that:

* shift and deployment length will be outlined in the deployment notice
* shift and deployment lengths will be monitored
* rest breaks will be communicated to personnel
* fatigue management of employees undertaking emergency management activities is a shared responsibility between employees and their managers or supervisors.

#### Mental health and wellbeing

DEECA places a high priority on supporting the health and wellbeing of our people. We have fit-for-purpose support services readily available, which can be ramped up in response to a significant incident.

DEECA recognises the potential psychological impact that emergency response activities may have on our staff, contractors, families and other individuals. In particular, staff and contractors may be exposed to potentially distressing activities and situations, such as the humane destruction and disposal of animals, which may also result in vicarious trauma to staff, families and others.

During the immediate phase of an emergency response to an EAD event, a State Wellbeing Coordinator is appointed to initiate the welfare support for response workers across the state as required.

DEECA also has a range of mental health and wellbeing supports that will be made available to personnel, including surge workforce, during and after an EAD response. Resources available include:

* Wellbeing Officers – will be deployed to the response to provide support to staff.
* Regional Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Coordinator – onsite dedicated EAP consultants that partner with DEECA’s people leaders and State Wellbeing Coordinator to provide known, trusted support.
* Peer Support Program – a confidential service offered by volunteers who are trained in Psychological First Aid and frameworks for supporting their work colleagues.
* Reach Out Program – an extension of the Peer Support Program offering phone-based support.

#### Zoonotic diseases

Some EADs can be caused by zoonotic infectious agents – agents that can also infect humans. In addition to this, there may be some specific OHS risks associated with dealing with animals. This has important implications for those impacted by the response activities and those working in the response.

DEECA is responsible for ensuring field-based staff (those who may be working in contact with animals) are appropriately trained and protected against zoonotic disease risk. This may include, but is not limited to:

* The provision of and ensuring appropriate use of PPE and other equipment
* Vaccinations such as Q fever or influenza
* Adequate briefings and training.

# EAD response

## Biosecurity Incident Management System

EAD events are a Class 2 emergency in Victoria. They are responded to using the Biosecurity Incident Management System (BIMS). BIMS is based on the Australasian Inter-agency Incident Management System (AIIMS) with additional operations layers to accommodate the specialist activities needed in a biosecurity response (see Figure 8).

At the national level, BIMS comprises five incident level classifications, from 1 (local response) to 5 (international response).

* Level 1: Local, district level response (business as usual)
* Level 2: Regional level response (business as usual)
* Level 3: State-wide response (State EAD Response Plan activation level)
* Level 4: National response
* Level 5: National response including international assistance

Victoria maintains three incident level classifications with Level 3 incorporating Levels 3, 4 and 5 of the national incident level classification (Figure 7) These classifications are incorporated into Victoria’s emergency management arrangements through the Biosecurity Sub Plan.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **National BIMS Incident Level Classification** | **Level 1** | **Level 2** | **Level 3** | **Level 4** | **Level 5** |
| **Victorian Incident Level Classification** | **Level 1** | **Level 2** | **Level 3** | | |

**Figure 7: Comparison of National BIMS Incident Level Classification and Victorian Incident Level Classification**

The BIMS structures described in Figure 8 below are a high-level guide and will vary with each response. Functional areas may be combined or split further for flexibility and to ensure appropriate span of control.




Figure 8: Example of the BIMS structure at the State and Local Control Centres. Functional areas may be combined or split further for flexibility and span of control.

Figure 9 illustrates the hierarchy of control centres for a Level 3 Class 2 EAD emergency aligned to the national BIMS structure. A key difference between the BIMS structure and Victorian Class 1 emergencies is that state level control (State Biosecurity Operations Centre) liaises directly with incident level control (Local Control Centres). For a Level 3 Class 2 EAD emergency, regional structures will also be relied on to support a response to an EAD outbreak (See section 8.1.1 for further detail).

Figure 9: Hierarchy of control centres in a Level 3 EAD emergency aligned to BIMS

**State Control Centre (SCC) Structure**

The SCC is Victoria’s primary control centre for managing emergencies. The SCC’s responsibility is to ensure the control and coordination strategies and arrangements are appropriate and adequate for current emergencies. Further detail on the SCC’s roles can be found in the SEMP.

Existing SCC functions will support the State Controller (Biosecurity). Deputy State Controllers (Biosecurity) may be appointed to lead functions horizontally across departments or agencies as required, for example, to administer the National Livestock Standstill, operations, industry engagement, policy coordination and to address other critical issues emerging in a response (e.g. significant risks to wildlife). Additional EAD roles will be embedded into the SCC in pre-identified areas such as intelligence, risk and consequence, and public information.

**State Biosecurity Operations Centre (SBOC) Structure**

The Incident Management Team (IMT) at the SBOC will have primary responsibility for the strategic planning and coordination of biosecurity operational activities across Victoria, in accordance with the strategic direction provided by the CVO, the CCEAD, the NMG and the SCC (see Figure 10).


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Figure 10: State Biosecurity Operations Centre Structure

**Local Control Centre (LCC)**

The IMT at the LCC will have the primary responsibility for planning, conducting and supporting all operational activities in its geographical area of responsibility.

In a Level 3 biosecurity emergency, the LCC Incident Controller (IC) or delegate will liaise with the Regional Emergency Response Coordinator (RERC) and Regional Controller (RC) to manage concurrent emergencies or coordinate EAD relief, recovery and consequence management activities.

Depending on the complexity or extent of the response, it may be necessary to establish more than one LCC. The focus of each LCC’s activities will be guided by the objectives established at the SBOC. There is a larger focus on the operational function and roles at the LCC, as shown in Figure 11. As noted above, if the scale and complexity of an EAD event warrants it, Regional Control Centres may be utilised or established and may be organised to provide control and coordination over an Area of Operations to manage an EAD outbreak.

**Forward Command Post (FCP)**

During an EAD response, there may be a need to establish one or more FCPs. The FCPs will manage field activities within a defined geographic area, with a focus on an identified task or range of tasks. FCPs are usually established to manage field activities associated with several premises or well-defined area, manage specific operational tasks in a defined area or conduct operational activities in a remote area.

Figure 11: Local Control Centre Structure\*

*\* Roles under the Operations function have been expanded to highlight the additional specialist roles required for an EAD response. Other functional units are outlined at a high level.*

### Victoria’s regional emergency management structures

An EAD emergency is distinctly different at the regional tier, compared to Class 1 emergencies. This is because under BIMS and the Biosecurity Sub Plan, control arrangements are primarily exercised at a state and local level – that is, without a regional level (see Chapter 8.1 BIMS).

Although regional level structures will not be utilised for primary control functions, they are still critical to enable regional coordination and support for the local response. Victoria’s Class 1 regional structures may be utilised to manage coordination activities across the regions. If the scale and the complexity of the emergency requires it, Class 2 structures such as Class 2 Regional Controllers or Area of Operations Controllers may be utilised.

As a result, Class 1 regional emergency management structures may support an EAD response as follows:

* **regional-level emergency management functions** – where an EAD-specific regional structure is not in place (see 8.1.1.1), RCs and Regional Control Teams may support an EAD response by ensuring regional-level coordination arrangements are activated, resources are released to support biosecurity response activities in the region and regional-level communication and engagement is occurring with impacted communities. They will also play a role in considering the management of concurrent emergencies unfolding in the region, including that any other emergency control measures are appropriately coordinated with any deployed EAD control measures.
* **regional-level relief and recovery functions** – DFFH is responsible for regional relief coordination, and Councils have that responsibility at the local level, and ERV is responsible for regional recovery coordination, with Councils responsible at the local level. The RERC and the Regional Emergency Management Team will support regional and local relief efforts in response to an EAD outbreak, including engaging with and gathering information from local communities and businesses, and identifying additional resources available from other agencies, departments and local councils to support an EAD response.

Engagement of regional structures will occur through the State Response Controller, who will be supported by relevant Deputy State Controllers (Biosecurity). DEECA, through Agriculture Victoria, will retain command structures within each region to support engagement and information sharing at a regional level for an EAD outbreak.

#### EAD response-specific regional structures

There may be circumstances where the State Controller (Biosecurity) needs to establish regional structures to manage control arrangements to respond to an EAD outbreak. This may occur if the size and complexity of an EAD outbreak warrants it, for example, if the scale of operations, number of infected premises or complexity of the disease requires Class 2 regional structures to support the effective management of an outbreak.

This involves the appointment of Regional Controllers (Biosecurity) for those regions with relevant EAD response operations. These Regional Controllers (Biosecurity) will:

* establish relevant coordination teams to support the emergency
* ensure regional relief and recovery arrangements are integrated into the response
* lead the regional response, including the requests of tasking of activities or regional resources to departments and agencies.

A Regional Controller (Biosecurity) will work in collaboration with the Class 1 RC, including with regard to the State Emergency Management Priorities.

#### EAD response Area of Operations

An extensive EAD outbreak encompassing multiple regions may require the declaration of an Area (or Areas) of Operations to ensure that the response measures across different regions are implemented in a consistent and coherent way, particularly with regards to the coordination of multi-agency relief and recovery. The State Controller (Biosecurity) will appoint an Area of Operations Controller/s as required.


### Control, command and coordination concepts applied to an EAD response

Under Victoria’s emergency management arrangements, the SEMP notes that control, command and coordination arrangements aim to ensure sufficient resources are deployed and coordinated to respond to an emergency. In the context of a major EAD response being delivered under Class 2 emergency management arrangements, this means:

* **Command** – will involve DEECA, primarily through Agriculture Victoria, directing its internal resources, people, governance, systems and processes to deliver response activities. This will also involve DEECA staff fulfilling key support agency roles in relation to critical infrastructure and wildlife. Other departments and agencies with key support functions will operate through their own command structures.
* **Control –** will involve the appointment of a State Controller (Biosecurity) and Deputy State Controllers (Biosecurity) to direct response activities across multiple departments and agencies horizontally to respond to the EAD outbreak, with the support of the CVO, and ED, Biosecurity Victoria, to ensure the response strategically aligns with technical advice and national considerations**.** For example, to manage the:
* tasking of activities between DEECA, Victoria Police, the Department of Transport and Planning (DTP) and other departments or agencies to implement a national livestock standstill (if one is established)
* tasking of resources from different departments and agencies to support the expanded operations that may be required to deliver control measures – e.g. to assist with traffic management at entry and exit points for a Restricted Area, deployment of Authorised Officers to assist with surveillance, testing and tracing etc.
* activating relief coordinators and allocating resources to support immediate relief activities that may be required as a result of the imposition of control measures – e.g. to support families on farms that may located in a declared Restricted Area, to support transport workers who may not be able to immediately return home in a national livestock standstill.
* **Coordination –** will involve the State Controller (Biosecurity) and Deputy State Controllers (Biosecurity) working with key emergency management officials, including SRC, ERC, SPLO, RERCs, IERCs and ICs, and relevant teams to coordinate the bringing together of people, resources and governance, systems and processes to ensure that the response to the EAD outbreak, as well as relief and recovery for the emergency, are occurring. This may include ensuring:
* control measures and response decisions are being implemented in accordance with the State Emergency Management Priorities, are managing competing priorities and are supported by an effective governance structure
* necessary resources are available from departments and agencies to support a response to the EAD outbreak
* warnings, communications and engagement with key groups and stakeholders are well communicated and consistent
* information is being shared across departments and agencies to enable them to implement their support agency roles in an EAD outbreak and manage any consequences the outbreak may have on their portfolio.

Figure 12 illustrates the control and coordination arrangements in an EAD response under Victoria’s emergency management arrangements (noting that key officials set out in the diagram, such as the CAiOC and CVO, will also have command functions within DEECA as the lead control agency).

Establishing effective control, command and coordination in the first 72 hours is critical to delivering a whole-of-government EAD response. Appendix F illustrates an example of the control, command and coordination priorities in the first 72 hours of an FMD response to support department and agency planning.






Figure 12: Control and coordination of an EAD incident

## Concurrent emergencies

Given the prolonged duration of an EAD major emergency, an EAD response is likely to occur concurrently with other major emergencies. When concurrent emergencies occur, they may require consideration of how control measures, resources and other operations are deployed to address different priorities in accordance with the State Emergency Management Priorities.

The State Controller (Biosecurity) must consult with the EMC, the State Response Controller and other relevant Class 2 State Controllers to determine and document appropriate control and coordination arrangements in a concurrent emergency.

Whenever there are concurrent major emergencies and competing demands for resources, the EMC will work with appointed state and regional controllers of relevant Class 1 and Class 2 events to ensure that state emergency management priorities are met, including examining whether other resources can be accessed.

There may be some cases where resources from other agencies or jurisdictions may need to be considered to control a concurrent emergency that is threatening life and provide relief from suffering.

The Victorian Government may be consulted through Cabinet or relevant Cabinet Committees in relation to the management of concurrent emergencies.

### Functional coordination

Commonalities between the BIMS and AIIMS functions contribute to effective cooperation and synergies between similar operations in control centres across the state. These systems are complemented by other incident management systems such as the Victoria Police Incident Command and Control Systems (ICCS). A clear articulation of lead and support relationships between SBOC and SCC functions at a state level is necessary to ensure that roles and responsibilities are aligned to appropriate lines of control, are clearly defined, and generate effective information flow and decision making.

Informal relationships exist between functions for the sharing of information. Formal tasking of functions between SBOC and the SCC occurs via respective controllers who may agree to share functional resources as required.

## Public information

### Public information overview

The public information function focuses on gathering, assembling and disseminating timely, tailored and relevant communication and information. The focus of these messages is to support and encourage appropriate responses and proactive measures in communities that are directly, or likely to be, affected by an incident or emergency. This may include the general public, industry, media, businesses, other agencies and/or government departments and internal stakeholders. In a biosecurity emergency, there is a high level of focus on engagement and developing tailored communications to specific industry groups as well.

A successful response relies on extensive voluntary compliance with restrictions, public reporting of suspected cases or breaches of movement controls and maintaining trust and confidence over an extended period. To facilitate success, public information and communication must clearly explain the situation and the actions to be taken by the community.

The most acute impacts of an EAD outbreak will be localised to specific regions and sectors. There will be a need for specialised and tailored communications and engagement with people most at risk within these regions, including multicultural (known as culturally and linguistically diverse – CALD) communities and people with disability. This will also include impacts on Traditional Owner partners within the region. These groups are at higher risk of not receiving incident information that is timely, relevant and tailored to assist them make informed decisions. Reaching and communicating effectively with vulnerable communities may directly impact the success of the outbreak response.

### EAD Communications Plan

A WoVG EAD Communications Plan has been developed to outline the role that each impacted Victorian Government department and agency will play in communicating throughout the response, relief and recovery phases of an outbreak.

The plan outlines the goals and objectives of WoVG communications, risks and issues to be considered, department accountabilities, channels and actions.

The Victorian communications team must also work to coordinate with other state and Commonwealth Government communications teams to announce elements of a response in a coordinated manner as required. DEECA will lead the control agency communications and public information strategy, while the SCC’s public information section will support the control agency in media and communications (as per the SEMP).

Other Victorian Government agencies, departments or entities may also be required to support communications by identifying the needs of and consequences for their audiences and use their networks to provide timely and tailored information to address their audience’s concerns and amplify control agency messages. Communication accountabilities are listed in the WoVG EAD Communications Plan.

### Establishing a public information function(s)

In the event of an EAD emergency, DEECA will establish a public information function within each IMT, led by a Public Information Officer (PIO). The public information function in any IMT should bring an end-to-end communications team together in one section, encompassing media, communications, customer service, digital channels and engagement activities.

DEECA will activate the public information function within the SBOC in the event of an EAD emergency, regardless of whether an EAD detection is within Victoria or interstate. Depending on the nature and requirements of the response, functions may be combined into one role, one person may be allocated to each function, or multiple people might be required for each function.. Public information in the SCC will lead on VicEmergency channels and collaborate closely with the public information function located in SBOC. VicEmergency provides a platform as the single source of truth which is focused on principles of timely, tailored and relevant messaging for community.

A public information officer/section at the local level is responsible for delivering media, communications and engagement activities specific to an impacted community, as it may require specific and tailored information, and further use of local channels and forums. The information may need to be provided in multiple languages depending on the needs of the impacted community.

Roles to be considered include media, internal communications, collateral, call centre, website, social media and stakeholder engagement. In addition, the SCC will have an information and warning section and the LCC may activate a community engagement section.

### Public information objectives in an EAD event

The public information objectives in the event of an EAD are to:

* generate accurate awareness of the EAD emergency immediately following confirmation of the disease in Australia and in parallel with the signing of legal orders, and to notify affected stakeholders that the national livestock standstill (if applicable) is in effect via industry, government and media outlets
* provide consistent, timely, tailored and accurate information to industry bodies, livestock/animal stakeholders, veterinarians, the supply chain and communities about the EAD emergency, how the government is managing the emergency, what they should do to minimise the impact of the emergency and where to seek further information
* promote the need to report suspected EADs in animals to the EAD Hotline on **1800 675 888**
* minimise consequences through communicating messages that support safety of food and human health and maintaining public trust and confidence in the response and the food and grocery supply chain
* ensure all departmental, partner agency and stakeholder personnel prepare adequate communication materials for their interaction with stakeholders and the public where necessary
* educate audiences about the EAD, control and management strategies to minimise further spread.
* A comprehensive package of materials has been developed by DEECA to support EAD communications on the first day of an outbreak within Victoria or in another state. This includes media releases, social media posts, website content, key messages, internal communications, draft advertising, call centre scripts and stakeholder communications.

### National communications coordination

The National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network (NBCEN) is the national body for coordinating communications activities in biosecurity emergencies. In the event of an EAD emergency, the NBCEN will be the forum for coordinating messaging, communications and engagement activities nationally. DEECA is the Victorian representative on the NBCEN.

The National Communications Playbook has been developed to guide the announcement process and initial collaboration for communications in the event of a major EAD.

### Digital first

All agencies should take a digital-first approach to communications and information. They are encouraged to use the Victorian Government digital guides and ensure that all content meets accessibility standards. For a large-scale or complex EAD, DEECA will consider developing a website on the Victorian Government Single Digital Presence (SDP) platform in consultation with Digital Victoria, which requires agencies and departments across the Victorian Government to contribute to the one website. Where an EAD is expected to be shorter term, the Agriculture Victoria website will be the primary source of information, and all communications should point back to this website. VicEmergency will also be a key digital platform for information and warnings.

### Call centre

The call centre managed by the DEECA Customer Contact Centre will be activated via the SCC as per usual VicEmergency arrangements.

The community will have access to the broadly promoted VicEmergency Hotline number (**1800 226 226**) for information in the event of an incident. The call centre will be available as a channel for those seeking further information, where information needs are not satisfied by online sources, and to provide alternatives for information to improve accessibility. The VicEmergency Hotline will be the single phone number for communities, capturing lessons from previous emergencies and following Victoria’s ‘all emergencies – all communities’ approach to emergency management. Call centre staff will, wherever possible, receive training to ensure they can appropriately support members of the community through an EAD outbreak, including impacted primary producers, CALD communities and Traditional Owner groups.

In the event of a declared EAD emergency, DEECA (and other relevant agencies) will provide knowledge articles to the Customer Contact Centre that can be utilised by Customer Contact Centre staff. This support will augment advice provided via the VicEmergency website and app and can assist particularly where more detailed, individualised and/or localised information is required. The VicEmergency website and app are the primary mechanisms for providing timely and accurate information to communities and the broader public. The VicEmergency Hotline replicates information from the website and the app as an additional method that the community can access as part of the state’s integrated warning system.

The EAD Hotline (**1800 675 888**) is the number for reporting suspect cases of disease in livestock. This phone number is a national hotline which is redirected to local call takers in each jurisdiction.

DEECA and other agencies may also consider other call centre arrangements for overflow if required, which must complement or be integrated with the agreed process.

Local councils and industry will play a role in delivering public information to the community.

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| **Preventing the spread of misinformation and disinformation in a response**  Pandemic responses demonstrate how trust in government responses can rapidly be eroded through the spread of misinformation and disinformation in media. In an EAD emergency, fringe social media and media campaigns could potentially question the Victorian Government’s response leading to mistrust and negative publicity. Furthermore, the emotional toll of the outbreak on farmers and veterinarians may cause them to turn to alternative media sources if they feel unheard and alienated by the government.  These risks have been identified in the WoVG EAD Communications Plan, along with mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood of these risks emerging. For example, to mitigate against the risks described above, government and agencies will:   * apply a nationally consistent approach to public information and communications through existing National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network (NBCEN) and aligning with national talking points * publish comprehensive information on website which can dispel myths * monitor social media to respond (as Agriculture Victoria) to myths about the EAD * ensure transparency in communicating government responses * provide webinars, forums and Q&As to educate about the disease and inform of supports available * work closely with impacted communities to ensure that effective supports can be quickly enacted in the event of an outbreak. |

## Livestock industry liaison

The cost sharing arrangements in the EADRA mean that industries have a say in EAD emergency response decisions. There is a clear expectation that affected industries will be engaged closely at all levels of the response and consequently there are specified roles for industry within the IMT as Livestock Industry Liaison Officers (Livestock ILOs).

The responsibilities of Livestock ILOs include, but are not limited to:

* providing regular and timely updates about the current response situation and control measures (actual and planned) to the peak industry body
* issuing information and advice on industry-specific policies, resources and factors (e.g. industry practices, practicality and consequences of control measures) to the State Controller (Biosecurity), via the Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Industry Engagement
* consulting industry contacts about policies, strategies and progress of the response
* commenting on and contributing to decision making where matters affect industry.

Livestock ILOs are subject to confidentiality agreements as described in the EADRA.

In addition to these roles, given the significant consequences on the agriculture sector and animal industries, there is an obligation of the response agency to ensure that industry and the community stay informed of the situation, strategies and decisions agreed by the NMG in specific EADRPs.

There is a parallel liaison requirement by strategic leaders of the response to work with community and industry bodies to keep stakeholders and influencers informed of the situation, strategies and concepts agreed by the NMG in specific EADRPs.

This liaison effort requires effective levels of engagement through established industry peak body and representative liaison networks. DEECA (through Agriculture Victoria) has well-established forums that can be used for this purpose at a state level, but local level liaison will need to be established with the assistance of local councils, farming and livestock transport organisations or other community-based organisations and businesses.

Coordination with Victorian Government agencies is detailed in Chapter Appendix F .

## Traditional Owner groups liaison

Given that the response to an EAD outbreak will have significant state-wide implications that may impact Traditional Owner groups cultural rights and Country, DEECA will work to ensure engagement and partnerships with Traditional Owner groups occurs through any emergency management mechanisms that are in place during an EAD outbreak.

In addition, a liaison officer role may be appointed to operate at a state-wide level to ensure that there is a key point of contact to coordinate and partner with those Traditional Owner groups that are impacted by an EAD response. An officer may similarly also be appointed at an incident management level to identify cultural heritage considerations, and also liaise with impacted Traditional Owner groups. Importantly, these liaison officers will not represent or make decisions for Traditional Owner groups.

## Other liaison arrangements

The response to the EAD outbreak may demand operational engagement with other parts of state and local governments. Arrangements may be put in place to ensure that emergency management liaison officers are in place to support effective interoperability including, for example, to support the management of public land, the impact on wildlife, or major impacts on critical infrastructure (e.g. water catchments within a Restricted Area or close to an infected premises) when required.

## Planning

Victorian agencies are responsible for planning the delivery of activities they lead for an EAD response. This could be for their responsibility as a support agency under the SEMP and/or for operational delivery under this State EAD Response Plan.

The planning function is responsible for the collection, collation, analysis (or interpretation) and dissemination of information. It also includes the development of written plans for the response to the incident. The planning function also acts as an information centre, providing information that contributes to the situational awareness and ensuring that response aims and objectives can be achieved in a coordinated manner.

### Response planning

During an EAD outbreak, DEECA is responsible for response planning. This includes communicating national plans and strategies to partner agencies to inform their specific response plans and ensuring that Victoria is contributing to a nationally consistent approach to managing the response. Planning for the response will occur in consultation with key stakeholders and partners where possible.

Response planning may include strategic and/or operational planning. Strategic planning is usually performed at a state and/or national level. Operational planning is most likely to occur at the LCC and will focus on activities within the local IMT’s area of responsibility, in alignment with the EADRP and the EAD Workforce and Capability Plan.

### Human resourcing

Agencies involved in an EAD response are responsible for the planning for all resources required to fulfill the activities under their jurisdiction.

The activation of a surge workforce will be centrally coordinated by DEECA, as the control agency, to ensure appropriate matching of workforce supply to operational demands and efficiency in workforce generation, training, administration, deployment and reporting.

The requirements for a surge workforce will be driven by operational requirements, such as the number of infected premises and surveillance requirements. These requirements will be monitored by the resourcing team within the LCC and where they are unable to fill resource requests, they will be escalated to the state resourcing unit at the SBOC. SBOC will collaborate closely with the SCC Resources Unit to identify and fulfill requests via the State Resource Request System.

#### Workforce coordination

The state resourcing unit at the SBOC will be responsible for operations related to forecasting resource requirements, shift planning and deployments. They are also responsible for the management of employment agreements, onboarding, workforce induction, training and pre-deployment safety of the workforce.

The resourcing unit at the LCC will be responsible for identifying the resource requirements, managing shift plans and deployment notices, the coordination of resource requests and escalation to the SBOC state resourcing unit.

DEECA will, in the first instance, utilise its own human resources or those directly within its control (through a pre-existing resourcing arrangement) prior to requesting assistance from elsewhere.

DEECA may also request resources via the SCC Resourcing Unit by utilising the State Resource Requesting System to request personnel/resources from Victorian emergency services organisations, for which approval authority rests with the relevant Chief/Commissioner/Head of Agency. The EMC will consider the balance of readiness and response commitments for all emergencies.

Additional surge workforce resources may be derived from the broader VPS and emergency services organisations (ESOs) by request, and if required, may be facilitated by:

* any declaration of an emergency situation under the PA Act which empowers agency heads to assign any task to employees (s.105E)
* any declaration of a state of disaster under the EM Act 1986, which provides broad powers to the minister to direct any agency to do, or refrain from doing, any act (s 24)
* *Victorian Public Service Enterprise Agreement 2020*, Part 8 Emergency Management, which provides common employment conditions for those VPS employees not covered by extant agency conditions.

Victorian Public Service (VPS) surge workforce resources will be requested and coordinated by DEECA through resource sharing arrangements.

Given the high demand for, complexity and coordination needs of the surge workforce resourcing, a special EAD surge workforce coordination team may be established if needed to ensure resourcing is available to meet the demands. The SCC would support logistical and resourcing related matters as required. The State Control Team could support decision making in relation to balancing response requests for concurrent emergencies.

In addition, DEECA may seek interstate or international resources in accordance with existing biosecurity mechanisms such as the Interstate Deployment Arrangements for Biosecurity Responses or internationally via the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve as outlined below.

DEECA (through Agriculture Victoria) has Memoranda of Understanding in place with South Australia and NSW to enhance collaboration for emergency disease outbreaks that occur near the borders. Other collaboration activities outlined in the Memoranda of Understanding include resource sharing, co-location and management of control centres and development of consistent policies.

The National Biosecurity Response Team, comprising trained personnel from across jurisdictions, is another group that can be accessed under national biosecurity arrangements to be deployed to support biosecurity emergencies. However, in an EAD emergency, multiple jurisdictions may be affected and therefore personnel are unlikely to be available for redeployment. The Commonwealth Government is also party to the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve agreement signed by Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States of America. This agreement provides participating countries with access to additional skilled veterinary human resources in the event of an EAD outbreak.

Private veterinarians will play a significant role supporting an EAD response. Animal Health Australia (AHA) has developed a national approach to engage vets. This approach enhances collaboration with private and government veterinary services to support consistent and transparent arrangements, with clearly defined [guidelines](https://www.agriculture.gov.au/agriculture-land/animal/health/engagement-of-private-veterinarians/national-guidance-document) for the engagement of private veterinarians during an EAD response.

Private veterinarians will be engaged either by:

* contracting vets through a service level agreement with veterinary businesses
* employing individuals through casual employment arrangements
* other specialised experts and services may also be contracted to support specific activities such as livestock/waste transportation, excavation, disposal and destruction activities
* additional surge workforce may be engaged as casuals, through labour hire or contracted services.

### Intelligence

DEECA is responsible for collecting, processing, analysing and evaluating information, and providing timely and accurate data to agencies involved in an EAD response and to decision-makers to support assessments of risks, threats and hazards to assist with planning.

DEECA is also responsible for providing technical specialists, such as epidemiologists and pathologists, capable of analysing and interpreting data relating to the biology of the causative agent of the EAD, and the evolution of an outbreak. Their insights will enable forecasting of the progress of the outbreak and provide advice on control methodologies and/or techniques. Outputs from technical analyses include intelligence that assists decision making and provides guidance for the planning of activities, such as movement restrictions, tracing, surveillance and vaccination. Collaborating with industry representatives for relevant information on impacted industry sectors, including technical advice regarding enterprise practices and equipment, business models and other factors which may influence response planning, is another responsibility that falls on DEECA.

Intelligence reports will be provided to all agencies to inform their support function and other concurrent activities. Agencies involved in an EAD response need to continue collecting, processing, analysing and evaluating information, and share relevant information with other agencies to assist with EAD response planning.

### Situation assessment

DEECA is responsible for disseminating timely situation assessments to all agencies and stakeholders. In a response, SCC and SBOC intelligence and data functions will support timely, robust, and single source data underpinning situation reports and assessments to support decision making across the response. Agencies involved in an EAD response will be responsible for coordinating timely situation assessments of their activities with DEECA.

Depending on the scale of the emergency, DEECA may appoint a Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Policy Coordination to develop and disseminate situation reports to key stakeholders such as the Minister for Agriculture, Secretary, DEECA, peak industry bodies and national decision-making forums. Rapid dissemination of accurate information will ensure transparency of the government’s decisions and actions for the public.

### Legal

EAD response activities must be conducted in accordance with appropriate State and Commonwealth Government legislation.

DEECA will provide legal services to support the EAD emergency including:

* developing proclamations, delegations, permits and orders
* advising on the legality of proposed policy decisions and operational activities
* providing legal advice on specific issues, as they arise
* briefing staff on their responsibilities regarding legal issues
* managing legal proceedings (if required).

Given the number of activities that are likely to require regulatory approvals, the different Acts that are involved and the potential volume of activities in this area, DEECA may require support from other agencies to ensure that all legal requirements are met. The support agencies should also provide guidance on expediting these legal requirements in an emergency situation and the timely processing of any regulatory approvals within activities undertaken under the direction of the control agency or within usual agency responsibilities.

### Information systems

DEECA is responsible for maintaining EAD response and associated information systems, such as MAX and Bioweb. This includes providing access to relevant information systems as well as onboarding and training all response personnel in their use. The finance and administration functions (see Chapter 8.9.10) will also utilise DEECA’s information system to maintain accurate case records for compensation and cost sharing.

DEECA will ensure appropriate data storage and security during an EAD response, aligning with established state and agency policy and agreements.

### Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping

DEECA is responsible for the collation of incident-specific geographic information and data to produce appropriate spatial products (mapping) and outputs, whether physical or electronic, to support the response. This mapping will rely on enhanced mapping data drawn from the GIS held by DTP and overlayed with additional agriculture, biodiversity and outbreak management mapping and data to assist with response management.

To reduce risks of harming areas of Aboriginal cultural heritage, as defined in the Aboriginal Heritage Regulations 2018*,* GIS mapping will incorporate areas of Aboriginal cultural heritage sensitivity overlays to inform response planning.

DEECA will also draw on mapping and GIS expertise available within the SCC to support this function and to assist with monitoring the broader situation.

## Logistics

The logistics function delivered in an EAD response is consistent with that implemented for other emergencies within Victoria. It is responsible for the identification, sourcing, provision, management and demobilisation or disposal of physical equipment, facilities, services and materials required by other functions within the EAD response.

The logistics function will liaise closely with the finance and administration function to support response and relief operations.

Where multiple departments and agencies are involved in a specific activity and common goods or services are identified, DEECA as the control agency will take the lead in determining logistical requirements. In the response to an EAD outbreak, at a strategic level, DEECA’s role will be supported via the State Controller (Biosecurity) accessing the SCC Logistics function to support its control of the response in line with other contributions by other agencies under their SEMP responsibilities. As the control agency, DEECA is responsible for:

* maintaining a catalogue (bill of materials) of logistical requirements by identifying the necessary items, equipment and supplies to ensure it can fulfill its role and responsibilities for the response
* sourcing and procuring items, equipment and supplies identified in the DEECA catalogue throughout the response
* coordinating payment of goods and services via the finance and administration section throughout the response and until the last purchase orders/contracts have been closed after the operational closure of the response
* managing and maintaining items, equipment and supplies throughout the response
* demobilising and/or disposing of items, equipment and supplies once the response is complete
* undertaking the strategic planning, operational planning and tactical planning for logistical requirements and communicating these where relevant to other agencies
* where possible, providing access to facilities, equipment and supplies that may assist another agencies to enact their responsibilities under the State EAD Response Plan.

Support agencies are responsible for:

* identifying the necessary items, equipment and supplies to fulfill their own responsibilities and activities
* sourcing and procuring items, equipment and supplies throughout the response to ensure they can fulfill their own responsibilities and activities
* managing and maintaining items, equipment and supplies throughout the response that their agency is responsible for
* demobilising and/or disposing of items, equipment and supplies that their agency is responsible for once the response is complete
* where possible providing access to facilities, equipment and supplies that may assist other agencies to enact their responsibilities under the State EAD Response Plan
* delivering induction and training for staff deployed through their own agency’s process to undertake activities for their agency’s responsibilities
* coordinating payment for goods and services associated with their responsibilities under the State EAD Response Plan until all invoices have been received and contracts closed
* coordinating logistical activities with their logistics counterparts in other agencies during the response.

Additional support for specialised equipment and services may be secured through Emergency Recovery Victoria’s Clean-up Panel.Regional Controllers, Regional Emergency Management Teams and other local mechanisms may also be consulted for assistance with securing appropriate logistics.

Where there is a need for additional physical resources that cannot be met through these or established procurement arrangements, SBOC will approach SCC Logistics for assistance.

## Operations

Operational activities in an EAD response can be significant, involving properties at different locations across multiple regions and several different activities often at different stages of investigation, contamination or eradication phases.

The operations function is responsible for the tasking and application of resources required to respond to the incident to achieve the operational objectives, while monitoring and managing operational performance. Operations are guided by the EADRP and other supporting documents such as AUSVETPLAN manuals, Nationally Agreed Standard Operating Procedures, and Standard Operating Procedures of Victorian agencies.

The main activities are outlined in more detail below.

### Livestock standstill

A National Livestock Standstill is a critical disease response activity to restrict the spread of EADs and is required to be activated upon detection of FMD anywhere in Australia. It restricts the movement of live susceptible animals across Australia, to give response agencies time to assess the possible extent of disease spread by tracing movements of affected livestock and livestock products, and to commence disease surveillance activities. High-risk areas include animal congregation sites such as saleyards, feedlots and shows, and vehicles in transit.

A National Livestock Standstill is declared by the NMG on the advice of CCEAD and is a result of all states and territories, in aggregate, applying jurisdictional livestock standstills through relevant state or territory legislation for a minimum of 72 hours.

In Victoria, a livestock standstill will be imposed on all susceptible animals through a Control Order under the LDC Actimmediately following the detection of FMD, regardless of the location of the initial detection within Australia. All of Victoria will be declared a Control Area and the Order will specify a range of prohibitions, restrictions or requirements to operate in the Control Area in relation to specified livestock and/or livestock products, fodder or fittings. Susceptible livestock at any given premises or location must not be moved from the premises. No susceptible livestock will be allowed to enter Victoria, noting that similar livestock standstill arrangements will be enacted across Australia at the same time by other state and territory jurisdictions, guided by national arrangements. Emergency permits for movement may be granted under special circumstances.

Under the legislation, persons may be prosecuted for moving livestock during the standstill period. Movement of people and non-susceptible livestock and their products will be permitted.

Activating a livestock standstill in Victoria

1. Notification, announcement and control of the livestock standstill

The NMG, on the recommendation of CCEAD, will coordinate the activation of a National Livestock Standstill. Upon national agreement, the Victorian Minister for Agriculture or the CVO will declare all of Victoria to be a Control Area and the associated movement restrictions will be gazetted under the LDC Act*.*

DEECA will activate the Victorian Livestock Standstill Implementation Plan and appoint a Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Livestock Standstill. Support will be provided from the SBOC as required.

* DEECA will notify stakeholders affected by the National Livestock Standstill through notification channels including VicEmergency, broadcast print media, Agriculture Victoria’s website, social media and roadside variable messaging board. To support circulation of key messages, all relevant Victorian Government agencies, local councils, authorities and industry peak bodies will brief their staff and key stakeholders.

1. Establishing traffic management points and livestock movement controls

Victoria Police will establish and resource prioritised traffic management points at interstate borders and roving patrols on main roads to stop livestock transport vehicles that are on the road and provide advice on the management of any animals within them. Victoria Police’s support for the National Livestock Standstill will be in accordance with the Victoria Police Operational Plan – *Victoria Police Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan*. Victoria Police will have a dedicated line to the DEECA livestock standstill function for advice on routes to nearest holding sites, information to provide livestock transporters and other technical information.

The DTP will provide logistical support to Victoria Police to establish and equip traffic management points at interstate borders and provide traffic management contractors. Traffic management points may be attended by the National Heavy Vehicle Regulator, DTP officers or contractors provided by DTP to support activities in consultation with Victoria Police.

Livestock transport vehicles with livestock which are already loaded and in transit within Victoria, may continue their journey in Victoria without a permit provided that:

* the journey began and will end within Victoria, and
* the destination is either another farm, a feedlot or an abattoir, or livestock is being returned to its place of pick-up or origin.

Transporters carrying livestock that cannot complete the journey within the required criteria must pull over when safe to do so and phone their transport company supervisor or the VicEmergency Hotline (1800 226 226) for further instructions.

1. Management and welfare of livestock

The person in charge of the animal will be responsible for managing their welfare. All saleyard owners and managers, with support from DEECA, will activate their saleyard livestock standstill plan. Owners and managers of premises where livestock is located (e.g. farms, feedlots, export facilities, saleyards, abattoirs and showgrounds) will enact contingency plans for the care and welfare of the animals that may be in their custody at the time of a livestock standstill.

1. Lifting the livestock standstill

A decision to ease, lift or extend the standstill in Victoria will be made by the CVO in consultation with the CCEAD and will be based on an assessment of the available intelligence and the risk of further spread of disease. The CVO will provide advice to the State Controller (Biosecurity) and relevant Deputy State Controllers (Biosecurity) to coordinate the conclusion of the standstill and issue relevant orders under the LDC Act to remove or amend movement controls as required.

Further information regarding the requirements for the livestock standstill are provided on the Agriculture Victoria website which is regularly updated to align with any changes to the national arrangements.

### Tracing

Tracing livestock movements and products is critically important to identify the source and potential spread of the EAD. It is also a crucial component of the early control of an EAD emergency, as identifying where infected and in-contact animals are located will inform the extent of the Restricted and Control Areas.

Tracing where animals, products or fomites may have come from (trace-back) or have gone to (trace-forward) is essential to identify the source and extent of the disease, inform epidemiological investigations, and ultimately contain the disease.[[7]](#footnote-8) Trace-back and trace-forward time periods (tracing windows) are specific to each EAD.

Livestock tracing for cattle, sheep, goat and pig movements is well established and managed through pre-existing tools developed to interrogate the NLIS database and known movement data across the whole supply chain. This data is available for analysis and triaging, allowing efficient and appropriate allocation of surveillance resources. Given the large volume of tracing required in a significant EAD incident, the tracing team is likely to require substantial numbers of staff.

Tracing of other susceptible species in an EAD emergency (e.g. deer, horses, alpacas and llamas) will require a manual approach as movement data is not consistently recorded or made available on a national database. The approach for disease detection and control of unmanaged animals is set out in Chapter 8.9.7.

Tracing also incorporates non-animal movements that can carry and spread disease. These include:

* **animal products** — meat, offal, dairy products, wool, skins, hides, semen, embryos, wastes and effluent (including any evidence of illegal swill feeding)
* **vehicles** — milk tankers, livestock transport vehicles, feed trucks, farm visitors’ vehicles, local council vehicles (e.g. rangers) and other rural industry vehicles (e.g. forestry contractors)
* **materials** — hay, straw, crops, grains and mixed feed
* **people** — people who live on the property, veterinarians, livestock agents, milk tanker and other vehicle drivers, artificial insemination personnel, sales and feed representatives, tradespeople, technicians, visitors and other rural industry contractors.

Tracing data for non-livestock movements will be captured manually and entered on the response case management system in MAX, DEECA’s biosecurity management platform.

Tracing team members will collect tracing information from a variety of sources. Tracing priorities are determined based on an epidemiological risk assessment, which ensures that follow-up investigations of premises identified by tracing are prioritised by the likelihood of transmission and the potential consequences for disease control activities.

Where the disease is detected in another jurisdiction, DEECA will be provided with details of trace movements into Victoria for subsequent risk assessment and/or investigation.

### Surveillance

Surveillance is an important tool in responding to an EAD emergency and will be carried out in accordance with the EADRP and other supporting documentation such as national and state surveillance strategies.

DEECA will develop and implement a surveillance strategy to identify the location of the disease during the response, then to subsequently establish Victoria’s proof of freedom from the EAD. Consistent with the requirements of the LDC Act, the public will be asked to report any suspicion of disease.

Surveillance will be comprehensive and may require additional personnel in the form of field staff to partner with authorised veterinary and animal health officers to form surveillance teams. Surveillance will be most intensive in declared Restricted Areas as it is deemed a high-risk area encompassing all known infected premises. Surveillance is also required in Control Areas and potentially for premises identified by tracing, including interstate movements.

Wherever suspicion of an EAD is reported to DEECA, a field investigation will be conducted immediately. DEECA will be responsible for obtaining and submitting samples to ensure rapid recognition and laboratory confirmation of cases. Samples will be collected and tested at either the Veterinary Diagnostic Services facility at AgriBio, the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) in Geelong or another laboratory approved by the CVO. A provisional diagnosis will be available as quickly as the testing protocol allows.

### Laboratory and diagnostic capabilities

DEECA is responsible for ensuring that there is sufficient laboratory capacity to process large numbers of samples as part of a surge response from an EAD emergency. A Laboratory Surge Resourcing Plan will be activated during an EAD outbreak to meet the increased demand for diagnostics and to enable the deployment of mobile laboratory vans to rapidly process field samples.

Agriculture Victoria’s veterinary diagnostics services and crop health services located at AgriBio, Centre for AgriBioscience, Bundoora is the approved veterinary diagnostic laboratory in Victoria.

The ACDP in Geelong is the national reference laboratory for EADs and is responsible for confirming any diagnosis of an EAD in Australia.

Samples collected in Victoria during an EAD investigation, surveillance or the proof of freedom phase may be sent directly to either or both AgriBio or ACDP depending upon the diagnostic requirements. Point of care tests (field-based test kits) may be used as a screening test under strict regulations, however confirmation of disease must be conducted at an approved veterinary diagnostic laboratory on all samples.

During the EAD emergency, DEECA is responsible for organising transportation of samples from surveillance properties to the appropriate laboratory. Agriculture Victoria’s mobile laboratory van may be deployed to support in-field sample collection, processing and transportation.

### Infected premises operations

DEECA is responsible for all authorised response activities that take place on any premises containing infected, or considered highly likely to contain infected, animals or animal products (infected premises). Operations can occur on a single property or on multiple properties concurrently, depending on the size of the outbreak and resource availability. All infected premises will have an infected premises site supervisor appointed who is responsible for daily operations on site.

Infected premises operations are resource intensive and require significant human and material resources, which can include a mix of government staff, labour hire and contractors providing specialist equipment and services to support operations. Departmental officers are likely to include those authorised under the LDC Act as well as staff who are not authorised. Given the intensity of the operations, DEECA resources might need to be supplemented by those from other agencies. Further details are outlined in the EAD Workforce and Capability Plan.

#### Site supervision

An infected premises site supervisor will be appointed by DEECA to manage a team responsible for all the activities that take place on an infected premises.

DEECA will be supported by Victoria Police as required in relation to safe site access and responding to protest activity. Staff at the site should report protestor or demonstrator activity to the Incident Controller (IC). The IC should report the activity to the State Controller (Biosecurity) for operational awareness and if necessary, request police assistance. If any response staff or person is at risk of violence or danger, emergency services should be contacted through 000.

#### Quarantine

Quarantine will be established by DEECA in accordance with the LDC Act. Quarantine notices will be issued by inspectors authorised under the LDC Act.

Quarantine may be placed on any premises, place or vehicle. Where a premises or place is quarantined, the notice may restrict or prohibit the movement into or out of the premises or place of all livestock, livestock products (e.g. milk, wool, skins/hides and manure), fodder (e.g. hay, silage, grain and pellets), fittings (e.g. equipment), any material (e.g. soil and sand) or vehicles. Following a risk assessment, some things or vehicles (e.g. family vehicle, feed trucks and milk tankers) may be exempted from the requirements of the quarantine notice at the time of quarantine or permitted to move into and out of the quarantine area by a written authority.

People are not quarantined as such but may be required to fulfill certain biosecurity requirements to enter or leave the quarantine area (such as shower, change clothing, or disinfect footwear) or not enter certain areas of the quarantine area (e.g. livestock paddocks or housing). In most instances, every effort is made to ensure that people can maintain their normal movements, including attending school and work.

In addition to this, DEECA will coordinate with any critical infrastructure operators who may be impacted by quarantine orders wherever possible. However, in an EAD outbreak, critical infrastructure operators should ensure they increase their biosecurity practices and engage with operators of a premises where livestock are located before entering their property. Operators and contractors should be prepared to apply biosecurity practices when entering any property with animals, and comply with any mandatory biosecurity requirements that may apply (e.g. quarantine arrangements), to safely access critical infrastructure and avoid any inadvertent transmission of an EAD.

It is an offence under section 112 of the LDC Act for a person to contravene any provision of a quarantine notice.

#### Restricted areas

In addition to quarantine areas, orders may also be made under the LDC Actto establish a Restricted Area around the site where a disease is identified, which will impose control measures to limit the spread of the disease.

This includes prohibiting, regulating or controlling markets, fairs, sales or race meetings, the presence or exposure of livestock where livestock or livestock products are exposed for sale for human consumption, exhibition, parade, race meeting or competition, and the movement of livestock products in or out of the control area.

Permitting arrangements may also be put in place to allow for limited activity to occur. These activities may be regulated subject to undertaking certain requirements (e.g. decontamination or cleaning requirements). Operations may be employed to administer these arrangements or requirements, such as permit checkpoints or cleaning stations at key entry and exit points for a Restricted Area.

DEECA will also coordinate with critical infrastructure operators about the impact of Restricted Areas on access to critical infrastructure. In addition to increasing their vigilance over undertaking biosecurity practices, critical infrastructure operators should be prepared to comply with biosecurity requirements to enter a Restricted Area. Critical infrastructure operators should engage with DEECA if major works are required in a Restricted Area.

#### Valuation and compensation

The LDC Actprovides for the payment of compensation for domestic livestock, livestock product and property (such as fodder, fittings or vehicles) that is destroyed for the purposes of controlling, eradicating or preventing spread of an exotic disease, and for any domestic livestock that is certified by an inspector as having died of an exotic disease.

No compensation is payable for consequential loss, such as loss of profit, loss of production, loss of markets or losses incurred by breach of contract.

The amount of compensation payable for livestock is based on the market value of the livestock at the earliest of the following events:

* the time at which the owner consulted a veterinary practitioner about the diseased livestock
* the time at which the owner notified an inspector of the disease under section 7 of the LDC Act
* the time at which restrictions on the movement of the livestock were imposed under Part 3 of the LDC Act
* the time at which the Secretary was notified that it was affected by or died from the disease.

In an FMD event, where a livestock standstill would be implemented immediately, livestock valuations would be based on market value established by the most recent physical livestock sales held prior to movement restrictions being imposed. This means livestock valuation and the amount of compensation paid in Victoria will not be affected by the negative impact of an FMD outbreak on livestock markets.

The valuation and compensation process is set out in the Victorian Government Guidelines for the Valuation and Compensation of Livestock and Property in an Emergency Animal Disease Event and is aligned to the AUSVETPLAN operational manual: *Valuation and Compensation*. The steps are summarised as follows:

* 1. **Inventory development** – In consultation with the property owner or authorised agent, DEECA staff will develop an inventory of affected livestock which an inspector has certified died as a result of the exotic disease or are ordered to be destroyed for disease control purposes, and any livestock product or property ordered to be destroyed as required for disease control purposes.
  2. **Valuation** - Valuation of the inventory by an appointed valuer using the appropriate valuation methodology.
  3. **Agreement** - Agreement by the owner to the inventory and valuation.
  4. **Application submission** -Completion and submission of an application for compensation for approval and payment.

The State Controller (Biosecurity) is responsible for the oversight and delivery of the valuation and compensation scheme and may be supported by the Deputy State Controller (Biosecurity) – Operations.

The oversight of the scheme at the state level is managed through the SBOC through two key functions:

* State biosecurity operations
* State finance and administration.

DEECA, through the state finance and administration function, is responsible for processing compensation forms and will seek to ensure applications are processed and payments are made as swiftly as possible.

Compensation paid by DEECA for livestock that have died or been destroyed as part of a nationally endorsed response may be eligible for cost-sharing under EADRA.

#### Destruction

Where destruction of affected animals is required under the EADRP, the humane destruction of susceptible livestock on infected premises will commence and be completed without delay, with due consideration for human safety and animal welfare. After an assessment of the most appropriate destruction methods, trained DEECA staff will oversee the humane destruction of animals.

DEECA activities related to the destruction of animals will be informed by the EADRP, relevant agricultural, wildlife and animal welfare legislation, including provisions in the LDC Act.

The safety of personnel working on any property will be monitored by the infected premises site supervisor and randomly audited by DEECA.

The welfare of animals during humane destruction will be monitored by the infected premises site supervisor and overseen by suitably trained response personnel or appointed animal welfare response staff working with destruction teams.

**Unmanaged animals** (also see Chapter 8.9.7)

Disease surveillance, control and/or destruction of susceptible wildlife or feral animals on private property or on public land may be required. This can include feral pigs, deer, goats or horses using the most appropriate methods for the species of animal. The LDC Act contains suitable provisions to support this activity on public or private land in the event of an EAD. However, in some cases, for example pre-emptive destruction without suspicion of disease, then an authority to control wildlife issued under the *Wildlife Act 1975* (Vic) and other relevant legislation for the destruction of wildlife (including hog deer on private land) may be required.

#### Disposal of carcasses and waste

Disposal of waste, including livestock and infected material during a response is the responsibility of DEECA and is critical to minimising the spread of the disease. DEECA activities related to the disposal of waste will be supported by relevant agricultural, environmental and emergency management legislation, including provisions in the LDC Act, the EADRP, the *Environment Protection Act 2017* and the EAD Waste Disposal Plan.

Waste requiring disposal will include **carcasses** as well as:

* **animal products** – meat, offal, dairy products, wool, skins, hides, semen and embryos, and wastes and effluent
* **agricultural materials** – hay, straw, crops, feeding stocks including grains and mixed feed
* **clinical waste** – including PPE, sharps, clinical specimens, laboratory cultures, tissues, pharmaceutical products, pathology materials and veterinary materials
* **other reportable priority waste (chemicals and liquid waste)** generated through decontamination operations.

Determining the location for the disposal of carcasses, animal products and agricultural materials will be based on the following waste disposal hierarchy:

1. **First preference** – on-farm (refer to [*Guidance for on-farm burial of carcasses in an EAD outbreak*](https://agriculture.vic.gov.au/biosecurity/animal-diseases/emergency-animal-diseases/guidance-for-on-farm-burial-of-carcasses-in-an-emergency-animal-disease-outbreak) or by other arrangements approved by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA))
2. **Second preference** – off-farm, including burial at landfill facilities and disposal at other approved sites.
3. **Third preference** – burial at a mass disposal facility (on private land).

Clinical waste will be disposed of via a licensed clinical waste disposal facility and other reportable priority waste will be disposed of in line with EPA requirements (e.g. milk may potentially be spread to land if suitable).

The EPA and DTP (and local councils where appropriate) will support the disposal program with expertise, assistance and permissions where required. The chosen method of disposal should consider biosecurity as the first priority and other factors such as risks to the environment and public health, transport distance and public amenity. The number and species of animals to be disposed of will also influence what disposal method is chosen. In a large outbreak, disposal options are likely to include both on and off-farm disposal. The disposal methods must have the ability to handle the required volume quickly and efficiently.

Other disposal methods may be considered where appropriate, and include, but are not limited to:

* composting
* shallow burial with carbon
* incinerating in approved facilities or in air-curtain burners
* rendering.

**On-farm**

DEECA is responsible for selecting the burial site, excavating on-farm burial pits, disposing of animals, and covering and monitoring the pits. The ‘Guidance for on-farm burial of carcasses in an EAD outbreak’ includes criteria to protect the environment (principally ground and surface waters) and public health. The property owner will be consulted throughout these activities and EPA will approve the burial locations as necessary. Proximity to conservation areas and Aboriginal Cultural Heritage areas must be considered when choosing disposal sites. The burial sites must be far enough away from conservation areas and areas of cultural sensitivity (such as midden sites and scar trees) to preserve the values associated with these sensitive areas.

DEECA will work with property owners to establish arrangements for monitoring burial sites for six to twelve months to ensure they are not leaking or eroding. Depending on how these progresses, this responsibility may transfer to the property owner.

In some circumstances where there are small numbers of animals on small properties, other disposal options may be appropriate, such as bringing in a mobile air-curtain burner or composting on-site.

**Off-farm**

DEECA is responsible for coordinating off-farm disposal including transporting carcasses and other waste in secure, leakproof vehicles to off-site disposal sites.

Once the waste is disposed of, responsibility for the security of this waste will transfer to the operator of these sites, e.g. the operator for waste disposed to landfill or DEECA for any waste buried in a mass burial facility. The EPA is responsible for regulating the disposal of waste on-farm and off-farm, and for the transport of waste off the farm.

Local councils may also be asked if they have capacity to receive carcasses and other waste in council-run landfills, with the support of EPA, to ensure they are approved to receive such waste.

All decisions will prioritise the necessary disease control outcomes, comply with the relevant legislation and regulatory approvals processes, be feasible and cost effective, and consider the environmental, public health, community and economic impacts within the context of an active emergency response.

#### Decontamination

Decontamination is the cleaning and then disinfection of equipment, materials (including soil), vehicles and people. Decontamination requirements for EADs are set out in AUSVETPLAN. Decontamination is a critical activity to control and reduce the spread of disease. Decontamination facilitates the safe movement of people, vehicles and equipment on and off farm properties.

It requires the two phases of:

1. Cleaning to remove all organic matter (e.g. dirt and manure), often by pressure washing or scrubbing with a detergent, and
2. disinfecting with a chemical suitable to destroy the infectious agent at the correct concentration and for the correct contact time.

Decontamination of infected premises will commence in unison with carcass disposal activities and will be overseen by DEECA staff. It is a shared responsibility between DEECA staff, farm owners, farm workers and private contractors entering or exiting infected premises.

Decontamination points may also be set up at traffic management points surrounding high-risk areas or other strategically important sites.

#### Monitoring and restocking

As the control agency, DEECA will lift restrictions on a previously infected farm and allow the restocking of the property with susceptible species after a period of time determined by a risk assessment. This time period will be dependent on various environmental factors including temperature and relative humidity, exposure time, decontamination procedures applied and destocking duration, as well as disease agent survivability.

Restocking may include the use of a small number of sentinel animals to demonstrate freedom from disease before a property is restocked to full capacity.

### Vaccination

Livestock vaccination may be an important part of disease control in some EAD responses. Vaccines for some EADs (e.g. anthrax, FMD and equine influenza) are available for use only during an outbreak and under an emergency permit approved by the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA). There are currently no vaccines registered for emergency use in Australia for African swine fever.

The decision to use vaccination as a disease control approach is recommended at a national level by the CCEAD and approved by the NMG and would be included in jurisdictional EADRPs. It could extend the time and requirements, including repeated surveillance testing, to regain freedom status post-eradication.

Vaccination may be considered for FMD if the disease spreads beyond the limit of available resources to contain it, to protect areas of high animal concentrations, to limit spread of infection, or to minimise virus excretion while awaiting destruction. Vaccination for equine influenza was used successfully in the 2007 outbreak in Australia.

Animal Health Australia (AHA) manages Australia’s FMD vaccine bank on behalf of governments and industry. The bank of vaccine antigens is held in the United Kingdom and covers the strains of FMD virus most likely to cause an outbreak in Australia. In the event of an outbreak of FMD and following NMG approval, the specified quantity of vaccine will then be sent to the preferred location(s) in Australia. AHA also has a contractual arrangement in place with a commercial supplier of vaccination equipment to be co-distributed with the vaccine in the event of FMD.

Under the LDC Act*,* an owner or person in charge of an animal may be directed to allow the vaccination of that animal. The APVMA emergency permit requires all vaccinated animals to be permanently identified.

Most vaccines now enable vaccinated animals to be distinguished from animals that have been infected with the disease virus through differentiation between infected and vaccinated animals (DIVA) testing. Therefore, vaccinated animals which have subsequently become naturally infected can be identified. Extensive testing of vaccinated animals may be required to prove that there is no natural infection present on a property during the proof of freedom phase of the response.

### Unmanaged animals

The role of native wildlife and feral animals in the transmission of an EAD in Australia is difficult to predict. Australia’s freedom from these diseases and uniqueness of Australian wildlife species means that there is limited available evidence as to the susceptibility or potential carrier status of our native animals to most EADs.

In FMD outbreaks overseas, wildlife and feral animals, such as deer and pigs, have not been considered to be a significant issue. Experience from overseas FMD responses to date indicate that the risk of transmission or recurrence from wildlife and feral animals is considered low and has rarely been demonstrated, despite extensive research.

However, in the event of an EAD emergency, surveillance of feral animals and wildlife populations may still be required as part of Victoria’s EAD surveillance strategy to minimise the risk of spread and ensure proof of freedom from the disease. This may involve EAD-susceptible feral species and wildlife being identified and an assessment of their potential role in EAD spread being undertaken. Generally, the highest risk of spread of an EAD by feral animals or wildlife will come from their interactions with livestock species (both direct and indirect contact). When susceptible feral or wildlife species are present in an EAD emergency area, a sampling strategy targeting them may be required and may form a component of the surveillance program.

Depending on the results of the surveillance program, control activities to reduce or entirely depopulate relevant species in a localised area may be undertaken.

For local knowledge on surveillance and sampling of wild animal populations, DEECA will call upon the expertise of relevant people, which may include Parks Victoria, the Game Management Authority, Zoos Victoria, Traditional Owner groups, local farmers and other relevant experts. Any decisions made to depopulate animals in a given area will be discussed with appropriate biodiversity and wildlife experts, and Traditional Owner groups before implementation.

Any surveillance or control activities relating to unmanaged animals required in an EAD emergency event would be undertaken, following risk assessment and under direction from the CVO, as part of the EADRP.

### Vector control

Insect vector monitoring and control may be required as part of the response to a vector-borne EAD. For some EADs, such as lumpy skin disease, biting insects can be a significant transmission route. For other diseases, insects might only be a minor component of disease spread and generally as a fomite (that is, the virus is physically carried on the insect’s body). Surveillance systems for vectors provide an understanding of the risk of transmission over time and enable assessments of the effectiveness of vector control interventions.

In Victoria, under the Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2019, mosquito management is the responsibility of all landowners or land occupiers. This applies to land owned/managed by both the public sector or government, or private residents, businesses and organisations.

Advice may be sought from agencies with expertise in mosquito management such as DH.

### Compliance and enforcement

The requirements under the LDC Act and the Livestock Disease Control Regulations 2017 provide requirements, infringement offences and penalties to enforce compliance with containment, control and eradication of disease. The legislation empowers and provides for disease control tools such as movement controls, quarantine, permit conditions and inspectors’ directions.

As the control agency, DEECA leads EAD compliance and enforcement. The LDC Act provides that in the event an exotic disease is declared under s 105(1), inspectors may also be appointed from:

* police officers and
* persons employed or engaged by emergency service agencies (within the meaning of the EM Act 1986 and 2013).

Public servants from all departments and agencies, and potentially other jurisdictions, may also be appointed as inspectors and will require specific training to undertake the role.

Victoria Police, DTP, the National Heavy Vehicle Regulator, the Victorian Fisheries Authority (VFA) and other agencies have staff that can be rapidly authorised as inspectors to support a livestock standstill and movement controls. Agencies such as the VFA, EPA and Parks Victoria have investigators that can also be authorised as inspectors under the LDC Act to support investigations. Appointments made from these sources would receive specific training.

DEECA will utilise all available compliance options within the compliance continuum, from education and extension through to prosecution. The LDC Act does not include provisions for on-the spot fines. Any matters determined for prosecution require charges to be laid and heard through the court. Under theLDC Act, a livestock owner convicted of an offence that impacts the disease control response may not be eligible for compensation for any livestock or property destroyed as part of the disease response.

All compliance and enforcement will be conducted consistent with DEECA’s Agriculture Victoria Compliance Management Policy.

Effective public engagement, communication and industry liaison are essential. Successful engagement will ultimately support compliance activities as people in regional communities are highly motivated to voluntarily comply with the requirements, due to concerns of actually or being perceived to contribute to disease spread, providing the information is clear and appropriate to the audience.

The LDC Act is the main instrument that will support compliance activities in relation to the containment, control and eradication of disease. However, there are a number of other acts and subordinate legislation that are required to support these activities, specifically the *Environment Protection Act 2017* and the *Planning and Environment Act 1987* are critical for disposal activities.

Agencies are expected to undertake compliance and enforcement activities within usual agency responsibilities consistent with their policies, procedures and responsibilities. Given the significant increase in the potential volume of activities in this area, DEECA is likely to require support from other agencies in ensuring appropriate compliance activities occur to manage potential risks.

### Finance and administration

The finance and administration function includes the management of financial arrangements and business systems associated with a response, as well as the management of records, data capture and information flow. The function may be established within LCCs, SCC and SBOC.

Victorian EAD response and associated information systems include MAX and BioWeb, which enable DEECA to maintain accurate case records for a large response. DEECA will provide response personnel with access to relevant information systems, as well as onboarding and training in their use.

Under EADRA, the lead agency within the affected jurisdiction is responsible for keeping auditable records of all expenditure with respect to operations conducted under the EADRP. Eligible costs incurred in the emergency response and proof of freedom phases can be cost shared under EADRA, if the response is nationally agreed. The finance function is responsible for the management of and accounting for all financial transaction preparation of cost sharing claims and participation in post-response audits.

The finance and administration function is also responsible for the payment of compensation claims under the valuation and compensation scheme.

The finance and administration function will operate under DEECA policies and procedures. All other Victorian Government departments and agencies involved will be required to establish, implement and comply with their own financial and administrative management policies and processes to provide auditable support for EAD cost claims and invoices submitted to DEECA in relation to the response.

# Proof of freedom

Following an outbreak of a major EAD, surveillance to prove freedom from disease will be required to demonstrate that infection has been eradicated from susceptible animal populations within the country or zone. This will enable any remaining movement restrictions to be lifted. Proof of freedom will be needed to satisfy trading partners and regain access to international markets, as well as underpin import controls to prevent the re-introduction of the disease.

The [WOAH](https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/animal-health-and-welfare/official-disease-status/) has the mandate from the WTO to officially recognise disease-free areas of countries for trade purposes. The Commonwealth Government is responsible for submitting an application to the WOAH to regain Australia’s disease-free status. This application is supported by information provided by the states and territories detailing the eradication procedures carried out, the surveillance program undertaken, results obtained, demographics of the animal population, records of movements, and relevant industry and government structures.

Any application should be based on the [*WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code*](https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-manuals/terrestrial-code-online-access/). If Australia is applying for part of the country to be recognised as free of disease (zonal approach) before country eradication is achieved, increased surveillance and movement restrictions may be required. The surveillance program will need to be consistent with national requirements, and carefully designed to produce sufficient data that is reliable and acceptable to the WOAH and international trading partners, while avoiding a program that is excessively costly and logistically complicated.

Although the WOAH provides guidelines for recovering disease-free status, including prescribed times, acceptance of disease-free status following an outbreak will most likely have to be negotiated with individual trading partners and may take months to years.

# Relief and recovery

## Whole-of-government approach to EAD relief and recovery

Planning for and delivering relief and recovery in an EAD event involves shared responsibilities requiring collaboration and coordination between individuals, communities, non-government organisations, businesses, all levels of government and other partners. Key government departments responsible for planning for and delivering relief and recovery, in accordance with arrangements under the SEMP, include:

* **ERV –** lead agency for the coordination of relief and recovery
* **DEECA –** lead agency for primary producer technical and financial support, lead agency for relief and recovery support in relation to natural environment, public land and waterways, and cultural and heritage sites (co-lead with Parks Victoria).
* **DJSIR –** lead agency for ‘post-farm gate’ support including food processing businesses, livestock transport, supply chain (including supermarkets) consideration and planning for tourism related impacts
* **DFFH –** lead coordination agency for psychosocial and wellbeing supports
* **DH –** lead agency for mental health support and maintenance of health service continuity, supporting coordinated public information messaging and providing specific public health advice
* **DE –** support agency for ensuring continuity of education, supporting students and teachers experiencing distress and hardship, supporting communicating messages to school communities
* **DTP –** support agency forsupporting transport operators to maintain and re-establish operations to support critical supply chains (e.g. livestock movements and food supply chains)
* **DGS (Local Government Victoria) –** support agency working with local governments.

A whole-of-government EAD Relief and Recovery Plan will be prepared to document the responsibilities of government agencies in delivering EAD relief and recovery activities and programs. This WoVG EAD Relief and Recovery Plan will be consistent with current relief arrangements and [Emergency Recovery Victoria - Recovery Framework](https://www.vic.gov.au/emergency-recovery-framework), including the recovery principles and lines of recovery approach.

## Principles underpinning EAD relief and recovery

The nature and extent of relief and recovery support required for an EAD event will depend on the size of the event and emerging economic and social impacts that arise over the long response and recovery phases.

The information below provides guidance on how relief and recovery could be undertaken in a response in accordance with any relevant EAD relief and recovery plans in place as well as supporting further development of EAD related relief and recovery planning. The principles to guide EAD relief and recovery include:

* **Relief and recovery must be enabled and delivered through emergency management frameworks –** Relief and recovery approaches need to align with current relief arrangements as per the SEMP and ERV’s Recovery Framework. The approach should work alongside the current emergency response governance structures and complement existing emergency disease management response plans.
* **Relief and recovery must be aligned with national arrangements** – Engagement and collaboration with the Commonwealth and other jurisdictions will be essential to ensure there is effective coordination across jurisdictions and the Commonwealth to deliver appropriate levels of support, including ensuring cross-border impacts and consequences are considered.
* **Support must be scalable, timely and impactful** – Providing appropriate levels of support quickly to primary producers and impacted sectors of the supply chain will result in benefits that extend to, and lessen impacts on, regional economies and communities.
* **Support delivery and outcomes must consider community wellbeing** – Psychosocial and community wellbeing is critical. Community psychosocial and wellbeing support will recognise the close linkages and inter-dependences between agriculture, farming families and local communities.
* **Sustainability of the agriculture, food-processing, related supply-chain and transport sectors and regional communities are an overarching consideration** – Recovery should support ongoing and sustainable participation in the agriculture sector and related industries by workers and business. Retaining human capital and knowledge is critical to recovery and supporting a thriving agriculture sector and regional communities.
* **Coordination should occur around place-based needs** – Programs and intervention should be place-based and recognise that all agencies can play a role, including local councils. Place-based programs and interventions should also consider the specific needs of different communities where relevant. This includes working in partnership with Traditional Owner groups and other First Peoples groups such as Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, to consider the impact of an EAD outbreak on communities’ cultural rights and consider their knowledge of Country, and CALD communities to ensure there is a holistic and trauma-informed approach to response, relief and recovery.

These principles could inform the development of programs to assist primary producers, impacted supply chains, food-processing, transport, and related industries and communities impacted by an EAD outbreak.

Relief and recovery support may be provided in addition to the valuation and compensation scheme which aims to offset losses from the destruction of stock and property as part of biosecurity control measures. Relief and recovery are not covered under national cost sharing arrangements for an EAD, such as the EADRA.

## Activation and coordination of EAD relief and recovery arrangements

In an EAD outbreak, local, regional and state tiers will immediately begin to identify significant relief and recovery needs that will require support under Victoria’s emergency management arrangements.

Activation of relief and recovery arrangements will be led by ERV and through the appointment of a State Emergency Relief Coordinator and a State Recovery Coordinator by the EMC, to manage relief and recovery during the outbreak. This will occur in accordance with any existing relief and recovery planning that may be applicable to an EAD outbreak, the decision-making principles above, and the developed whole-of-government EAD Relief and Recovery Plan. Relief and recovery responsibilities in the SEMP will continue to apply.

In an EAD outbreak, activation and coordination of relief and recovery under these arrangements would involve:

* **Relief and recovery activation and coordination occurring under existing emergency management structures –** ERV, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (DFFH) and local councils will coordinate relief and recovery support and delivery in an EAD outbreak. ERV will coordinate state-tier relief and recovery support with:
  + regional and municipal relief tiers – led by DFFH at a regional level and local councils at a municipal level
  + regional and municipal recovery tiers – led by ERV at a regional level and local councils at a municipal level
* **Relief coordination will activate to address animal welfare issues, emergency financial assistance and psychosocial support, and economic assistance for agriculture sectors and related industries –** coordination will be provided byDEECA for animal welfare, the Australian Red Cross for any food and water relief (e.g. in Restricted Areas) and DFFH for psychosocial support. Given the nature of an EAD emergency, DEECA will acquit its animal welfare relief coordination role through its line of control for delivering a response to the EAD outbreak.

As noted above, relief in an EAD outbreak may cover immediate economic support given the significant economic impacts on Victoria’s community and the viability of critical components of the economy, food supply chain and regional communities that depend on the agriculture sector. DEECA and DJSIR will work closely with ERV on the delivery of economic relief to ensure the stabilisation of critical industries occurs. This includes adopting a whole-of-government approach to engaging with the Commonwealth Government on national relief measures and working with other jurisdictions to design a consistent approach to relief activation and outcomes.

* **ERV and DEECA will provide information on relief programs and support** **–** ERV will provide information and services in relation to relief and community support at a state-wide level. DEECA as the control agency will also provide information on relief activities specific to the agriculture sector. This would be coordinated through Emergency Management Joint Public Information Committee in accordance with the WoVG EAD Communications Plan.
* **Recovery will be a multi-agency effort that must be sustained over the long-term –** DEECA will lead recovery for the agriculture sector, DJSIR for industry and business recovery, DH for mental health and wellbeing, and DFFH for psychosocial recovery. A coordinated approach will be critical to an effective and sustainable recovery from a major EAD outbreak that includes the impacted agriculture sector, related industries and communities.
* **System-level oversight would enable effective coordination of the relief and recovery effort –** The State Recovery Coordination Committee, State Emergency Relief Team and Regional Relief and Recovery Committees across all eight emergency management regions will play a vital role in coordinating state-tier and regional-tier relief and recovery governance, management and operational delivery in an EAD outbreak in accordance with the above principles and any relevant relief and recovery plans that may be in place.

**Appendices**

1. **Acronyms, definitions and abbreviations**

| **Acronym/term** | **Explanation/definition** |
| --- | --- |
| ABARES | Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences |
| ACDP | Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness |
| Agency | government or non-government agency  EM Act 1986 s 4  For the purposes of this Plan, agencies include government and non-government organisations, government departments, local councils and volunteer organisations with a role in emergency management as listed under Roles and Responsibilities. |
| AHA | Animal Health Australia |
| AIIMS | Australasian Inter-agency Incident Management System |
| APVMA | Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority |
| APIQ | Australian Pork Industry Quality |
| AUSVETPLAN | Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan |
| BIMS | Biosecurity Incident Management System |
| Biosecurity Sub Plan | State Emergency Management Plan - Animal Plant Marine and Environmental Biosecurity Sub Plan |
| CALD | Culturally and linguistically diverse |
| CAOiC | Control Agency Officer in Charge |
| Class 1 Emergency | A Class 1 emergency is:  a. a major fire; or  b. any other major emergency for which Fire Rescue Victoria, the Country Fire Authority or the Victoria State Emergency Service Authority is the control agency under the state emergency management plan.  EM Act 2013 s 3 |
| Class 2 Emergency | A major emergency which is not:   1. Class 1 emergency; or 2. a warlike act or act of terrorism, whether directed at Victoria or a part of Victoria or at any other state or territory of Australia; or 3. a hijack, siege or riot.   EM Act 2013 s 3 |
| CSIRO | Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation |
| CVO | Chief Veterinary Officer |
| CCEAD | Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease |
| DEECA | Department of Environment, Energy and Climate Action |
| DE | Department of Education |
| DFFH | Department of Families, Fairness and Housing |
| DGS | Department of Government Services |
| DH | Department of Health |
| DJSIR | Department of Jobs, Skills, Industry and Regions |
| DTP | Department of Transport and Planning |
| EAD | Emergency Animal Disease |
| EADRA | Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement |
| EADRP | Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan |
| EAP | Employee Assistance Program |
| EMC | Emergency Management Commissioner |
| EM-LEARN | Emergency Management Victoria’s Lessons Management Framework |
| EMLO | Emergency Management Liaison Officer |
| EMV | Emergency Management Victoria |
| EPA | Environment Protection Authority |
| ESO | Emergency Services Organisation |
| FMD | Foot-and-mouth disease |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| GVP | Gross Value of Production |
| IGAB | Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity |
| IC | Incident Controller |
| ILO | Industry Liaison Officer |
| IMT | Incident Management Teams |
| LPA | Livestock Production Assurance |
| MEMPC | Municipal Emergency Management Planning Committees |
| NBCEN | National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| NMG | National Management Group |
| NLIS | National Livestock Identification System |
| NSW | New South Wales |
| OHS | Occupational Health and Safety |
| PIC | Property Identification Code |
| PIO | Public Information Officer |
| PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |
| RC | Regional Controller |
| REMPC | Regional Emergency Management Planning Committees |
| RERC | Regional Emergency Response Coordinator |
| RRC | Regional Recovery Coordinator |
| RReC | Regional Emergency Relief Coordinator |
| SAC | State Agency Commander |
| SBOC | State Biosecurity Operations Centre |
| SCC | State Control Centre |
| SCoT | State Coordination Team |
| SCT | State Control Team |
| SCM | State Consequence Manager |
| SEMP | State Emergency Management Plan |
| SEMT | State Emergency Management Team |
| SERC | State Emergency Relief Coordinator |
| SPLO | Senior Police Liaison Officer |
| SReC | State Recovery Coordinator |
| SRCC | State Recovery Coordination Committee |
| State EAD Response Plan | The Victorian Government State Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan |
| VFA | Victorian Fisheries Authority |
| VPF | Victorian Preparedness Framework |
| VPS | Victorian Public Service |
| WoVG | Whole of Victorian Government |
| WOAH | World Organisation for Animal Health |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

1. Legislation

The table below sets out legislation (both Commonwealth and State) that provides authority to undertake actions during an EAD response.

| Legislation | Acronyms and Abbreviations | Jurisdiction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aboriginal Heritage Regulations 2018 |  | State |
| Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals  (Control of Use) Act 1992 |  | State |
| Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals  (Control of Use) Regulations 2017 | AVC Regulations 2017 | State |
| Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals  (Control of Use) (Ruminant Feed) Regulations 2015 | AVC Regulations 2015 | State |
| Biosecurity Act 2015 |  | Commonwealth |
| Biosecurity Regulations 2016 |  | Commonwealth |
| Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 |  | State |
| Catchment and Land Protection Regulations 2012 |  | State |
| Conservation, Forests and Lands Act 1987 |  | State |
| Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 |  | State |
| Emergency Management Act 1986 and 2013 | EM Act 1986 and 2013 | State |
| Environment Protection Act 2017 | EP Act | State |
| Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 |  | Commonwealth |
| Fisheries Act 1995 |  | State |
| Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 |  | State |
| Livestock Disease Control Act 1994 | LDC Act | State |
| Livestock Disease Control Regulations 2017 |  | State |
| National Parks Act 1975 |  | State |
| Marine and Coastal Act 2018 |  | State |
| Marine Safety Act 2010 |  | State |
| Parks Victoria Act 2018 |  | State |
| Public Administration Act 2004 | PA Act | State |
| Planning and Environment Act 1987 | PE Act | State |
| Plant Biosecurity Act 2010 |  | State |
| Plant Biosecurity Regulations 2016 |  | State |
| Port Management Act 1995 |  | State |
| Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 | POCTA Act | State |
| Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Regulations 2019 |  | State |
| Wildlife Act 1975 |  | State |
| Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 |  | State |
| Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2019 |  | State |
| The Food Act 1984 |  | State |
| Wildlife Act 1975 |  | State |

1. List of relevant operational documents

Status correct at time of publication and subject to change. Documents that are available to the public have been linked.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Plan | Description | Status |
| [AUSVETPLAN](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/ausvetplan/) | AUSVETPLAN disease, operational, enterprise and management manuals, guidance documents, public information manuals and resource documents provide nationally agreed guidance to EAD response | Active |
| Concept of Operations: Agriculture Victoria Response to Biosecurity Emergencies | Describes how Agriculture Victoria biosecurity emergency responses are initiated and managed, the roles and operational arrangements of Agriculture Victoria at activated State and Local Control Centres, and how Agriculture Victoria’s emergency operational arrangements link into the national arrangements and Victorian emergency management arrangements. | To be reviewed |
| Control, command and coordination priorities in the first 72 hours of an FMD response scenario – Supplementary document | This document builds on the scenario provided in Appendix F to provide additional detail on the roles and responsibilities of appointed officers and key committees in an EAD response. | Active |
| EAD Relief and Recovery Plan | Outlines the principles for EAD relief and recovery support, types of support to be provided and the roles and responsibilities of departments and agencies. | Under development |
| EAD Waste Disposal Plan | Outlines the waste disposal hierarchy, processes, requirements and approvals to support waste disposal decisions during an EAD response. | Under development |
| EAD Surge Workforce and Capability Plan (DEECA) | Outlines where EAD response surge resources can be sourced and how they will be managed. Also outlines the framework to support the training of resources. | Under development |
| Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan (EADRP) | A nationally endorsed response plan that outlines an agreed approach to the eradication and/or containment of an EAD incident, and supports national cost-sharing under EADRA. Developed by the combat jurisdiction, recommended by CCEAD and endorsed by NMG. | Template is ‘active’. Final plan is developed in a response. |
| [Emergency Recovery Victoria – Recovery Framework](https://content.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-06/ERV-Recovery-Framework-%28June-2023%29.pdf) | Details Emergency Recovery Victoria’s role, the principles that underpin recovery work and the desired outcomes for communities. | Active |
| National Emergency Animal Disease Communications Playbook | An EAD crisis communications document that sets out strategies, decision-making frameworks and pre-prepared content for initial actions across key time horizons (1hr, 6hrs, 12hrs, 24hrs, 3 days, 7 days). | Active |
| [Nationally Agreed Standard Operating Procedures](https://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/nationally-agreed-standard-operating-procedures/) | Describes various operational aspects of an EAD response. They are agreed on by all states and territories. | Active |
| Victoria Police Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan – Livestock Standstill Borders | Integrates arrangements to support the control agency by providing static traffic management points to stop said vehicles until cleared or turned around on advice of control agency. | Active |
| Victoria Police Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan – Restricted Areas and Movement Intrastate | In accordance with supporting orders made under s29 of the LDC Act,supports the control agency through:   1. Preventing livestock movement from restricted areas using traffic management points. 2. Providing mobile patrols to detect breaches of livestock standstill orders. 3. Supporting inspectors under the LDC Act where they are met with aggression or violence. 4. Respond to public order incidents (activism or protest). | Active |
| Victorian Government Emergency Animal Disease Communications Plan (DEECA) | Outlines the role that each impacted Victorian Government department and agency will play in communicating throughout the response, relief and recovery phases of an outbreak. The plan outlines the goals and objectives of WoVG communications, risks and issues to be considered, department accountabilities, channels actions. | Active |
| Victorian Government Guidelines for the Valuation and Compensation of Livestock and Property in an Emergency Animal Disease Event | Outlines the policy, process and responsibilities for administering the valuation and compensation scheme aligned to the AUSVETPLAN. | Active |
| Victorian Livestock Standstill Implementation Plan (DEECA) | Describes how government agencies, businesses and the community will work together in an integrated and coordinated way to implement a livestock standstill within Victoria. | Active |

1. Department and agency roles and responsibilities

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Department / agency** | **Examples of agency roles in an EAD response** |
| All departments and agencies | * Provide information and intelligence gathered through the department/agency’s portfolio responsibilities to inform the response to an EAD outbreak. * Manage the impacts and consequences of an EAD outbreak relevant to the department’s portfolio. |
| DE | * Provide advice and support to children’s services and schools in affected area. |
| DEECA | In addition to acquitting its control agency responsibilities for an EAD outbreak under the SEMP, DEECA has a number of response support agency roles in an outbreak, including:   * management of animal welfare through DEECA’s control responsibilities * support in relation to:   + public land   + surveying and protecting threatened ecosystems and species   + critical infrastructure within the department’s portfolio, including access to electricity, water and gas infrastructure.   In an EAD emergency, DEECA’s relief and recovery roles include:   * lead recovery agency for primary producer technical and financial support * lead recovery agency for any response impacts on wildlife welfare, public land, threatened ecosystems, and cultural and heritage sites (co-lead with Parks Victoria). |
| DFFH | * Coordination of emergency shelter and psychosocial support. * Regional relief coordination. * Contribute information and intel about EAD outbreak impacts and consequences relating to DFFH portfolios as needed. |
| DGS | * Support response to maintain telecommunication services. * Support agency for local councils. * Work with commonwealth and state government, industry and community groups on the management of threats to mitigate economic impacts. * Provide information and intelligence and work with local councils to respond to the EAD outbreak. |
| DH | * Provide mental health and wellbeing information and advice, and promote services during response and recovery in coordination with other agencies. * Support assurances to community regarding non-public health significance of EADs. |
| DJSIR | * Liaise with post-farm gate business and industries and provide information to support business continuity where safe to do so. * Liaise with the food and grocery sector to provide assurances of food safety and manage potential changes in consumer demand. * Support agency to food and grocery sector for supply continuity. * Support regional tourism by providing information and advice to encourage business. * Liaise with interstate agencies, industry and communities including the Cross Border Commissioner |
| DTP | * Provide incident management/emergency personnel, EMLOs, Authorised Officers, equipment. * Support livestock standstill, traffic management, and livestock disposal. * Support portfolio entities such as Freight Victoria and manage broader supply chain implications including ports. * Provide road closure information to media and the public. * Provide support to DJSIR to ensure food and grocery supply continuity if road closures and/or consumer demand shifts. * Consider and advise DEECA on planning and land use implications of an EAD outbreak. |
| EMV | * Provide EMLOs and other incident management/emergency personnel. * Management of SCC functions.​ |
| EPA | * Provide EMLOs, Authorised Officers and other incident management/emergency personnel.​ * Support for livestock disposal – approval of sites, management of waste. ​ * Support with powers under the *Environment Protection Act 2017* where required.​ * Provide advice to the community on the effects of waste and disposal​. |
| ERV | * Coordinate relief activities. * Support transition from response to recovery. * Lead intergovernmental recovery coordination including applying for state and Commonwealth funding if required. * Support establishment of community recovery committees and recovery hubs. |
| Local councils | * Provide community awareness and information about livestock standstill and local response activities. * Support shows and agricultural events during livestock standstill, manage stray livestock. * Provision of available facilities for staging areas or forward command posts. * Support for local road closures and mapping alternative routes around Restricted Areas. * Relief and recovery coordination, community support. * Provide information and intelligence gathered by councils to support a response to an EAD outbreak. |
| Parks Victoria | * Provide advice on the management of wildlife on public lands. * Provide EMLOs and other incident management/emergency personnel. |
| Victoria Police | * Management of vehicles carrying livestock, in coordination with NSW and South Australian equivalents, with respect to livestock standstill.​ * Enforcement of intra-state movement restrictions.​ * Management of potential civil unrest/protests associated with livestock standstill within Victoria, movement restrictions.​ |


1. Responsibilities and membership of key emergency response teams and meetings

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Emergency response teams** | **Roles and responsibilities** |
| **STATE LEVEL** | |
| **State Control Team (SCT)**  **Chair**: State Controller (Biosecurity)  **Members**:   * EMC * Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) * Chief Fire Officer DEECA or State Agency Commander (SAC) * DTP SAC (for duration of livestock standstill) * Senior Police Liaison Officer (SPLO) * State Consequence Manager (SCM) * State Recovery Coordinator (SReC) * State Emergency Relief Coordinator (SERC) * Functional leaders as required * Others as determined by EMC/State Controller (Biosecurity). | * Oversees the control functions and responsibilities for the EAD outbreak on behalf of the EMC. * Implements the strategic context of the readiness, response and, where appropriate, relief and recovery phases. * Responsible for overseeing the implementation of key control measures, including national livestock standstill, tracing and surveillance activities, infected premises operations, laboratory surge plan and compliance and enforcement activities. |
| **State Emergency Management Team (SEMT)**  Chair: EMC  Members:   * State Controller (Biosecurity) * Chief Veterinary Officer or delegate * EMLO / SAC / State Duty Officer (SDO): DH, DFFH, DE, DJSIR, DTP, DEECA, DGS, EPA * SPLO * SCM, SReC and SERC * State Communications Manager * Victorian Cross Border Commissioner and/or Interstate EMLOs * Other emergency management functional roles across Government and agencies as appropriate. | * Contributes to a state strategic plan with high-level actions for agencies to manage consequences of the EAD outbreak, in particular the impact of trade embargoes on the agriculture sector and the flow-on impact on community. * Considerations may include impacts of response activities on business, mental health and wellbeing, education, rural regions and tourism. * SEMT develops mitigation and response strategies to reduce the EAD outbreaks’ impact on Victorians. |
| State Coordination Team (SCoT)  Chair: EMC  Members:   * State Controller (Biosecurity) * CVO or delegate * SPLO * SReC and SERC * SCM * Other active State Response Controller(s) and/or State Controller(s) * Others as determined by EMC. | * Oversees coordination functions and sets the strategic context of readiness, response, relief and recovery of active emergencies, in particular resourcing the response to an EAD outbreak. * Given the potential prolonged nature of an EAD response, SCoT will be the primary forum for the management and coordination of concurrent emergencies. |
| State Emergency Relief Team (SERT)  **Chair**: State Emergency Relief Coordinator (appointed by EMC)  **Members:**   * EMLO / SAC / SDOs: ERV, DH, DFFH, DE, DJSIR, DTP, DEECA and DGS * Victorian Cross Border Commissioner and/or Interstate EMLOs * Industry EMLOs as required * Non-government organisations (NGOs) depending on the nature and scale of the outbreak. | * State-level coordination of relief activities. * Provide relief expert advice and coordination for the delivery of relief operations. * Develop and implement a state relief plan, in line with relevant WoVG EAD relief and recovery plans, that supports local and regional operations. * Monitor and contribute to emergency relief situational awareness and operations, for the preservation of life and provision of essential needs. |
| State Recovery Coordination Committee (SRCC)  **Chair/s**: CEO – ERV, EMC  **Members:**   * ERV representative * EMLO / SAC / SDOs: DH, DFFH, DE, DJSIR, DTP, DEECA and DGS * Victorian Cross Border Commissioner and/or Interstate EMLOs * Industry EMLOs as required * NGOs depending on the nature and scale of the outbreak. | * State-level coordination of recovery activities. * Develop and implement a state recovery strategy in line with relevant WoVG EAD relief and recovery plans that meets the needs of the community and ensures coordinated delivery of recovery activities. |
| Emergency Management Joint Public Information Committee (EMJPIC)  **Chair**: State Communications Manager  **Members:** Senior communications officers from all agencies. | * Support operational public information processes in a Class 2 EAD emergency by coordinating whole-of-government emergency management communications and community engagement. * Coordinate appropriate stakeholders for each specific event where possible, including state, local and federal agencies, businesses, and relevant industries. * Foster partnerships with media. |
| **REGIONAL LEVEL** | |
| Regional Control Team (RCT)  **Chair**: Regional Controller  **Members**:   * Agency Commanders * DEECA subject matter expert or RAC * Regional Emergency Response Coordinator (RERC) * Regional Emergency Relief Coordinator * Other subject matter experts as determined by Regional Controller | * Control Class 1 emergencies for the region. * Prioritise concurrent emergencies or preparedness. |
| Regional Emergency Management Team (REMT)  **Chair:** Regional Controller/delegate  **Members:**   * RAC / EMLO all agencies including: DEECA, DH, DFFH, DE, DJSIR, DTP, EPA, Local councils * RERC * For border regions - Victorian Cross Border Commissioner EMLO +/- interstate EMLOs. | * Regional resource allocation. Will escalate any unfulfilled requests to the state level. * Consequence management – develop a regional strategic plan with high-level actions for agencies to manage consequences, including from concurrent emergencies and the impacts of the EAD on regional communities. |
| Regional Relief and Recovery Committee (RRRCtee)  **Chair**: Regional Emergency Relief Coordinator (during relief) / Regional Recovery Coordinator  **Members:**   * ERV representative * EMLOs: DH, DFFH, DE, DJSIR, DTP, DEECA, DGS, Local councils * For border regions - Victorian Cross Border Commissioner and/or Interstate EMLOs * Industry EMLOs as required * Community EMLOs as required. | * May be stood up in regions where there is no EAD detection or infected premises to support relief and recovery coordination. * Regional coordination of recovery activities. * Implement a recovery strategy that meets the needs of the overall community as well as distinct individual communities. * Liaise with SRCC to provide regional impacts and intelligence to the state level. |
| **LOCAL LEVEL (BIOSECURITY INCIDENT)** | |
| Biosecurity Incident Emergency Management Team (IEMT)  **Chair:** Incident Controller (Biosecurity) / delegate  **Members:**   * Municipal Emergency Response Coordinator(s) (MERC) * Municipal Emergency Resources Officer(s) (MERO) * Relevant EMLOs: e.g. DH, DFFH, DE, DJSIR, DTP, local councils * Industry EMLOs as required * Community EMLOs as required. | * Support the IC to manage the consequences of the response in the local area. * Work with regional and state-level counterparts to ensure local impacts are addressed through the implementation of relevant WoVG relief and recovery planning. |

## Control, command and coordination priorities in an illustrative FMD response

The following scenario provides an illustration of control, command and coordination arrangements for an EAD outbreak. The scenario (see 13) involves FMD being detected outside of Victoria followed rapidly by its detection in multiple sites across Victoria over a 72-hour period. This scenario is intended to illustrate arrangements for the broad range of control measures that may be employed to manage an EAD outbreak – i.e. not all EADs require a national livestock standstill as a control measure. An FMD outbreak is used as the example to illustrate all the possible control measures and structures required in an EAD outbreak.

Figure 13: 13 Overview of the described FMD scenario and key activities in a response



The key control, command and coordination priorities that this **scenario** would involve are as follows:

* **before formal detection in Australia (e.g. suspicion of FMD in Australia)** – confidential establishment of key control, command, and coordination components, where possible, before formal confirmation of FMD detection in Australia, to support the rapid implementation of key control measures.
* **in the first 24 hours** – the disease is initially detected outside of Victoria, and control, command and coordination continue to stand-up to implement control measures to limit the disease’s incursion into Victoria and determine whether it is has already spread into Victoria.
* **in the next 24 to 48 hours** – the disease is detected in Victoria, control, command and coordination arrangements must manage an escalation of control measures to limit disease spread and commence operations to eradicate the disease.
* **in the next 48 to 72 hours** – when additional infected premises are identified in Victoria, control, command and coordination arrangements, must sustain the implementation of all control measures while rapidly expanding operations to intensify detection of the disease and eradicate the disease across multiple sites.
* **72 hours until proof of freedom** – command, control and coordination arrangements must maintain control measures for a sustained period (potentially months) until testing establishes the disease has been eradicated in Australia.

Further details, of the key priorities are set out below. Illustrative examples of the likely priorities for key officials, teams and meetings are also described in Supplementary Material A .

In setting out examples of priorities to address this scenario, it is important to note that each response to an EAD outbreak must be adapted to the circumstances of the specific disease and broader context of the EAD response. This appendix is a guide only as each response to an EAD outbreak will have different control, command and coordination arrangements and control measures.

#### 

#### -24h to 0h: Priorities before the disease is formally announced in Australia

**Scenario: What has happened?**

Australian CVO has notified the Victorian CVO of a likely FMD positive case in another jurisdiction. Confidentiality will remain paramount until detection is confirmed given the implication for national and international trade. Briefings will initially be limited to key officials to prepare to activate the emergency arrangements. Once a formal diagnosis has confirmed disease presence and been announced by the federal Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), other key stakeholders will be briefed.

**Key priorities:**

Key elements of Victoria’s emergency management arrangements will commence activation while maintaining confidentiality until confirmation of the disease is announced. The initial priority will be to establish the senior tier of the command, control and coordination arrangements (e.g. senior-DEECA executives, control centres and emergency management officials) in anticipation for mounting an EAD response including:

* the Secretary, DEECA, as the CAoIC for a biosecurity emergency, appointing a State Controller (Biosecurity) and the subsequent appointment of Deputy State Controllers for National Livestock Standstill, Policy Coordination, Industry Engagement and Operations, where possible,
* relevant briefings to the senior tier of the command, control and coordination arrangements, in particular the EMC and the State Response Controller, about the required response strategy to the EAD under national biosecurity arrangements and relevant national decision-making developments.

#### 0h to 24h: Priorities in the first 24 hours after formal detection has occurred outside of Victoria

**Scenario: What has happened?**

Testing confirms a positive FMD case in another state and the Commonwealth makes an announcement on the FMD detection. All susceptible livestock exports are suspended. Industry begins to assess the impact of trade restrictions.

**Key priorities in the first 24 hours**:

Given the above scenario, priorities in this 24-hour period will include:

* continuing to establish and extend control, command and coordination arrangements, including:
* convening key emergency management teams and meetings including the SCT, SEMT and SCoT
* activation of control centres to support these arrangements including the State Control Centre and the State Biosecurity Operations Centre
* participating in national decision-making forums to understand the FMD risk and facilitate a coordinated response with other jurisdictions,
* supporting executive government to understand the impacts of the FMD outbreak and consider the response actions, and
* engaging with regional level Class 1 structures to ensure situational awareness and activate any necessary support arrangements.
* begin implementing four key control operational measures in the first 24 hours:
* establish a Control Area and implement the National Livestock Standstill
* activate a permit system to support controlled and risk-assessed movements of product and/or animals and mitigate animal welfare issues that may arise,
* surveillance testing, and
* tracing to identify high-risk animals and/or products from high-risk or infected properties.
* initiating emergency communications to ensure the community understands the livestock movement controls, the importance of good biosecurity practices and to encourage reporting of symptomatic livestock.
* activating online media collateral and call-centres.
* organising agriculture and transport industry engagement and key stakeholder forums to advise of the FMD detection and response measures.

#### 24h to 48h: Priorities in the 24 hours after detection of an infected premises in Victoria

**Scenario: What has happened?**

Surveillance testing finds a confirmed FMD case at a property in Victoria. Additional response activities and control measures are instigated, including the implementation of Restricted Areas, further tracing and surveillance, and the mobilisation of responders to the infected property. Industry continues to assess the impacts of trade restrictions and now considers the implications of the FMD detection in Victoria. As community awareness increases, there is increasing demand for further information about the outbreak and response activities.

**Key priorities:**

Given the above scenario, the priorities in this 24-hour period now include:

* continuing to expand control, command and response arrangements, including:
* appointing Incident Controllers to manage the Victorian response at the infected premises
* establishment of a Local Control Centre to manage operations at the infected premises
* engaging with Class 1 Regional Controllers of the Region where the infected premises is identified regarding what support may be required for the Incident Controller, as well as updating Class 1 Regional Controllers in other regions
* engaging with local council emergency management officials to ensure situational awareness of and agreed support (if needed) for operations at the Infected Premises
* implementing new control measures to:
* impose Restricted Area(s) and issuing quarantine notices for infected premises,
* deploy operational teams to commence humane destruction, disposal and decontamination activities.
* continue to establish and ramp-up control measures, including, surveillance, tracing and investigation of symptomatic animals.
* activating surge resourcing to sustain response operations in anticipation of additional FMD detections in Victoria.
* expanding communications and emergency warnings to advise of the detection in Victoria, including what new restrictions and movement controls are in place.
* briefing agriculture, transport sector and other key stakeholders to advise of the FMD detection and response measures and deploying industry liaison roles into the response structure.
* providing relief for producer, farming families, workers or community to meet immediate relief needs at the infected premises.
* supporting recovery planning by collecting intelligence on impacts associated with the national livestock standstill and trade embargos on industry and the community at a state-wide and regional level.

#### 

#### 48h to 72h: Priorities in the 24 hours after additional infected premises are detected in Victoria

**Scenario: What has happened?**

Surveillance testing and tracing undertaken in the previous 24 hours has identified that FMD has spread to other properties in Victoria across different emergency management regions. Industry begins to understand the commercial implications of trade restrictions and response measures. Industry representatives and businesses begin to reach out to government for support. The broader community continues to seek information about control measures, their impacts and the Victorian response activities, in particular the effectiveness of control measures and the inadvertent impacts they may have on people, animals, business and the community.

**Key priorities:**

Given the above scenario, priorities in this 24-hour period will include:

* expanding command, control and coordination arrangements, including:
* local-tier structures to manage multiple infected premises, such as establishing additional Local Control Centres or Forward Command Posts (as necessary), and
* considering whether regional structures such as Area of Operations specific to the biosecurity emergency are required.
* imposing control measures at infected premises, including quarantine, movement controls, and destruction, disposal and decontamination activities.
* considering mass waste disposal options.
* expanding testing and tracing surge capacity to continue to identify and limit the disease spread.
* expanding surge resourcing and triaging available resourcing to support wider response operations.
* working through national arrangements on status of livestock standstill arrangements and planning for ongoing movement restrictions of susceptible livestock into and throughout Victoria following national livestock standstill.
* expanding communication to address questions and reiterate messages; activate advertising campaign.
* engagement with industry, businesses and impacted communities commences to understand the impacts of the FMD outbreak – e.g. the economic, health, mental health and psychosocial impacts - to inform WoVG recovery programs and initiative planning.
* expanding relief activities across regions to support humans and animals at additional infected premises.

#### Ongoing priorities from 72 hours onwards until proof of freedom from FMD

**Scenario: What has happened?**

Following national discussions at CCEAD and NMG, the national livestock standstill concludes but FMD continues to be detected via tracing and community reporting of symptomatic animals at different sites across Victoria. The CVO maintains Orders to limit livestock movements within Victoria and mitigate the spread of FMD within the state. Destruction and disposal operations have commenced at infected premises. Declared areas (Restricted Areas and Control Areas) will continue to be modified depending on the location of new infected properties. Operations will commence at these sites as resources become available.

Industry, impacted businesses, and the community are engaging with government for support through relief and recovery programs as the extent of the trade restrictions and the breadth of the response work is fully realised. The community’s interest and engagement with the response will continue, particularly regarding the effectiveness of the response and its inadvertent impacts on people, animals, the economy and the community.

Relief and recovery supports may need to continue for some time as proof of freedom is established and trade begins to resume. This phase may last many months or years, with recovery extending beyond this period.

**Key priorities:**

Priorities at all levels will be modified, as required, in response to the changing needs of the outbreak response and national decisions. State-wide operations and deployment are maintained until surveillance suggests the spread of disease has stopped in Victoria and operational activities have been completed. During the proof of freedom phase, resources may be de-escalated and/or reprioritised to surveillance activities until this stage is complete.

Relief and recovery support for the Victorian agriculture sector, related industries and sectors, and the community will continue as the response continues and the impacts of the FMD outbreak are fully assessed. In addition to this, additional priorities may emerge to implement the waste disposal strategy to deal with mass waste disposal requirements, the management of FMD on public land (e.g. unmanaged animal populations), and supporting control measures in peri-urban areas.



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1. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2022 ([DAFF](https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/exotic-animal-disease-preparedness-report%20-%20sept-2022.pdf)) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, 2022 ([ABARES](https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/biosecurity/biosecurity-economics/fmd-update-of-2013-estimate)) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The State EAD Response Plan was originally endorsed by the Victorian Government in October 2022. A subsequent revision was published to reflect January 2023 machinery of government changes. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The DH and DEECA maintain arrangements to ensure an effective response can occur in the event a disease has biosecurity and public health implications. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2022 ([DAFF](https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/exotic-animal-disease-preparedness-report%20-%20sept-2022.pdf)) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Industry partners include but are not limited to the agriculture sector, food processing, livestock transporters and other related supply-chain industries. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Fomite: an object or materials, such as clothes or vehicles, which are likely to physically carry the infective agent (e.g. virus, bacteria) on their surfaces. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)